The aim of this study was to investigate the skills need of the solar industry in Scotland, based on a proposed ambition of 4 to 6 gigawatts (GW) installed solar capacity by 2030.

These were addressed through a literature review, model development and stakeholder engagement.

Findings

• The workforce serving the solar industry will need to increase from approximately 800 in 2023 to an estimate of over 11,000 full time equivalent (FTEs) in 2030. Most of this growth is attributed to construction-related activities, especially for ground-mounted solar projects
• People currently employed in the industry have the right skills, however, there is a significant shortage of skilled labour. Therefore, there is a need for more people to be recruited into the solar industry. The existing training provision, with some development and adaptation, can provide the necessary skills to those who do not have direct solar industry experience.
• If skilled workforce shortages are not addressed, the potential impact on the ability to deliver 4 to 6 GW of solar capacity by 2030 could be significant, given the difference between current and required future workforce levels.  
• The expansion to around 11,000 FTEs by 2030 includes 9,100 FTEs for construction related activities, almost 82% of the new workforce required. These workforce requirements are relatively temporary. In contrast, approximately 2,000 FTEs will be required for operation and maintenance activities, which provide more lasting employment needs.
• The highest levels of workforce requirements were identified in the following specialisms: electricians, grid connection engineers, high voltage technicians, electrical engineers and constructions workers.
• This research points to two pathways for achieving a suitable skillset for these specialisms:
  • Upskilling in addition to general technical training through short courses or in-house training, or
  • Adding PV-relevant modules to existing training courses.
• The installation of commercial rooftop projects is and will continue to be concentrated in and around the main clusters of population in the central belt of Scotland, the Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, the east- and north-east of Scotland and in and around the Inverness area.
• The majority of the ground-mounted projects will be located in more rural and less densely populated regions of Scotland, particularly Aberdeenshire, Angus, Fife and Tayside, where there is availability of land at a size appropriate for these larger systems. The installation of ground-mounted systems is expected to require a partly mobile and partly fixed workforce.
• Reliable data relating to the future pipeline of domestic rooftop projects is not readily available.

For further details please read the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

March 2024

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4518

Executive summary

Aims

The aim of this study is to investigate the skills need of the solar industry in Scotland, based on a proposed ambition of 4 to 6 gigawatts (GW) installed solar capacity by 2030. These were addressed through a literature review, model development and stakeholder engagement. We also relied on the expertise of solar industry specialists in the study team.

Findings

The modelling was carried out assuming the delivery of 6 GW by 2030. This assumes a split between 3.5 GW ground-mounted, 1GW commercial rooftop and 1.5 GW domestic rooftop solar panels.

We developed a hypothetical deployment pathway that delivers 6 GW of solar power by 2030. On basis of this pathway, the workforce serving the solar industry will need to increase from approximately 800 in 2023 to an estimate of over 11,000 full time equivalent (FTEs) in 2030. Most of this growth is attributed to construction-related activities, especially for ground-mounted solar projects, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Workforce requirements to deliver 6 GW solar capacity in Scotland by 2030, in FTE. Based on hypothetical deployment pathway.

Overall, stakeholder engagement suggests that the people currently employed in the industry have the right skills, however, there is a significant shortage of skilled labour. Therefore, there is a need for more people to be recruited into the solar industry. The existing training provision, with some development and adaptation, can provide the necessary skills to those who do not have direct solar industry experience.

If skilled workforce shortages are not addressed, the potential impact on the ability to deliver 4 to 6 GW of solar capacity by 2030 could be significant, given the difference between current and required future workforce levels.

The expansion to around 11,000 FTEs by 2030 includes 9,100 FTEs for construction related activities, almost 82% of the new workforce required. These workforce requirements are relatively temporary. In contrast, approximately 2,000 FTEs will be required for operation and maintenance activities, which provide more lasting employment needs.

The highest levels of workforce requirements were identified in the following specialisms:

• electricians
• grid connection engineers
• high voltage technicians
• electrical engineers
• constructions workers, including:
• civil contractors
• general labourers / operators
• crane operators / lifting contractors
• roofers

Our research points to two pathways for achieving a suitable skillset for these specialisms: 1) upskilling in addition to general technical training through short courses or in-house training, or 2) adding PV-relevant modules to existing training courses.

In terms of geographic distribution, we base our estimates on the project pipeline data in the Renewable Energy Projects Database at the time of writing (December 2023). Our estimates suggest that the installation of commercial rooftop projects is, and will continue to be, concentrated in and around the main clusters of population in the central belt of Scotland, the Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, the east- and north-east of Scotland and in and around the Inverness area. The majority of the ground-mounted projects will be located in more rural and less densely populated regions of Scotland, particularly Aberdeenshire, Angus, Fife and Tayside, where there is availability of land at a size appropriate for these larger systems. The installation of ground-mounted systems is expected to require a partly mobile and partly fixed workforce. Reliable data relating to the future pipeline of domestic rooftop projects is not readily available.

Recommendations

Actions to address the skills shortages in Scotland will be essential for the success of Scotland’s solar PV industry in its delivery of 6 GW installed capacity and for meeting broader renewable energy objectives. The development and delivery of these actions should be led by industry, but will require support from and collaboration with schools, colleges, universities, training providers and relevant public sector bodies.

We suggest the following actions to address the skills challenges highlighted:

• Developing strategies to promote the solar industry and attract new entrants. These should highlight its net zero and sustainability credentials and be designed for primary, secondary, further and higher education students, as well as individuals already in the workforce. These should clearly illustrate the wide range of potential career pathways for individuals at all levels of education.
• Putting in place initiatives to design and specify renewable energy and solar-specific course content. Potential options could include:
• a dedicated apprenticeship in renewable energy
• college and university courses (such as electrical engineering) and apprenticeships (such as electrician and construction) that provide the opportunity to specialise in renewable energy and/or solar PV system installation
• extension of the vocational graduate apprenticeship scheme to cover a wider range of subjects, such as electrical engineering.

Glossary / abbreviations table

Introduction

Background

By late 2023, Scotland’s solar energy capacity was recorded at approximately 600 megawatts (MW) consisting of domestic and commercial rooftop installations and a small number of ground-mounted installation^[1].

In 2021 Solar Energy Scotland called upon the Scottish Government to commit to a minimum of 4 GW solar energy by 2030, with an ambition to reach 6 GW (Solar Energy UK, 2023). In October 2023, the Scottish Government publicly announced a proposal for a solar deployment ambition of 4-6 GW by 2030 (Scottish Parliament, 2023). A final decision on this proposed ambition will be made in the final solar vision, which is due to be published within the Energy Strategy and Just Transition Plan in summer 2024.

Purpose of this study

To deliver 4-6 GW of solar by 2030, ground-based solar farms and rooftop systems would have to be deployed at a scale that has never been attempted before in Scotland. A skilled workforce would play a crucial part in enabling this scale of activity and it is essential, therefore, that any skills gaps and/or shortages within the workforce are identified, so that skills providers and policymakers can develop actionable strategies to close these gaps. This study investigates the skills needs for the solar industry in Scotland, based on the proposed ambition to reach 4 to 6 GW installed solar capacity by 2030. The key objectives are to:

• Model the current and future workforce requirements in Scotland’s solar industry assuming 6 GW installed capacity by 2030.
• Use these models to estimate the number of skilled workers required at each stage of the project lifecycle for the different types of project (ground-based and rooftop).
• Identify the geographical spread of the workforce, identifying where jobs will be located in Scotland.
• Assess the potential future demand for skills and identify any skills gaps.

Study methodology

The study relies on a literature review, insights from the experience of study team members and ITPEnergised in managing hundreds of solar projects, internal ITPEnergised interviews, study-specific modelling and stakeholder validation. Stakeholder engagement included interviews with ten stakeholders in the solar industry and a presentation at Solar Energy Scotland (the Solar Energy UK Scottish Working Group).

Section 4 provides an overview of the solar industry.

Section 5 details the solar project lifecycle, job roles and skills levels.

Section 6 quantifies the number and types of jobs required currently and to 2030.

Section 7 details the demand for skills, challenges and ways of addressing these challenges.

The report concludes with observations on future skills requirements and makes recommendations for actions required to address the skills challenges identified in sections 8 and 9.

Solar industry overview

Solar photovoltaic systems

The key components of a solar photovoltaic (PV) system are the solar panels that are constructed from layers of highly specialised semiconductor materials. When the sun shines on a solar panel, the energy causes electrons to be released from these materials and flow from one layer to another. When the layers are connected in an electrical circuit, electrons are ‘pushed’ towards the metal conducting elements (electrodes and wires) creating direct current electricity. This is known as the photovoltaic effect.

In addition to the solar panels themselves, other components in a typical PV system could include electrical connections, output power lines, inverters, mounting equipment, devices that manage the electricity exchange with batteries, batteries, meters, wiring, power processing and grounding equipment. The installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance of this equipment requires specialised skills.

Market overview

Global energy generation by solar photovoltaic

Globally, solar PV generation increased by a record 270 terrawatt hours (TWh), up 26%, in 2022, reaching almost 1,300 TWh. It demonstrated the largest absolute generation growth of all renewable technologies in 2022, surpassing wind (International Energy Agency, 2023).

A notable trend in the solar energy sector is the decreasing costs of PV systems. The prices for solar PV modules recently saw a dramatic decline, nearly halving year-on-year. This price decrease coincided with a substantial increase in manufacturing capacity, which reached three times the levels recorded in 2021.

Chinese companies have an almost complete monopoly over the global solar PV cell manufacturing industry, rendering the supply chain more prone to disruption. Overall, China is expected to maintain an 80-95% share in the global solar PV supply chain, as reported by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in their Renewable Energy and Jobs Annual Review 2023 (IRENA, 2023).

UK and Scottish market overview

In the UK, the cumulative installed capacity of solar PV reached nearly 16 GW at the end of 2023. In late 2023, Scotland’s solar energy capacity was recorded at 600 MW, as noted previously (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2023).

In addition to the installed capacity, there is, at the end of 2023, an estimated pipeline capacity of 1.74 GW, as shown in Table 1 (data extracted from the REPD database).

The data above refers to commercial projects (ground mounted and rooftop) only, as such data is not collected for domestic rooftop installations.

The largest solar farm in Scotland, sited on land at the Errol Estate in Perthshire, came online in 2016 (Scotland Land & Estates, 2023). This 13 MW scheme, incorporating 55,000 solar panels, produces enough electricity to power 3,500 homes. The capacity of the other operational solar farms and commercial roof-top installations is 10 MW or less, with the majority being less than 1 MW.

Despite the reduction in PV system costs, coupled with the recent spike in energy prices in the UK, demand for domestic solar PV has not increased significantly, according to a stakeholder (industry association) contacted during this study. This is due to factors such as relatively high absolute costs and reduced grant availability.

In Scotland, solar value chains are primarily focused on the design, installation and maintenance aspects of solar PV systems. This focus aligns with the global trends in the solar market, with manufacturing centralised in China.

Solar industry context

Interviewees for this study have strongly emphasised the constraints they are facing with regards to obtaining a grid connection and to the processing of planning applications. Although this was not the focus of the study, it is an important contextual detail because bottlenecks in these allied sectors are likely to have a significant impact on how many projects progress through the pipeline. This, in turn, impacts the sector’s demand for skilled workforce. Details are provided in Appendix B.

Solar project lifecycle, job roles and skills levels

Solar project lifecycle

A solar PV project lifecycle has five phases, as shown in Figure 2: equipment manufacture and distribution; project development; installation, commissioning and handover; operation and maintenance; and decommissioning. This has been developed based on the ITPEnergised experience of consulting and managing hundreds of projects for solar PV developers:

Figure 2: Solar project lifecycle

While the figure includes the first stage, equipment manufacture and distribution, this is shown for completeness only due to lack of PV manufacturing in Scotland, as discussed above.

With regards to decommissioning, this does not currently apply, since a typical solar installation has a design life of 25-30 years^[3] and the solar industry in Scotland is not sufficiently mature to require skills for decommissioning. However, it is expected that some systems will be coming to end-of-life in the next ten years and decommissioning will become relevant in the timeframe to 2030. For example, the first domestic rooftop panels in the UK were installed in 1994 (Changeworks, 2024).

The project lifecycle covers both ground and rooftop solar projects, although, at a more detailed level there are some differences in the activities carried out at each stage of the lifecycle in a large ground-based project compared to a domestic rooftop. This, in turn, affects the timelines for initial feasibility and the project development stages of these project categories, as follows:

• Large ground mounted – two to three years depending on size and complexity^[4].
• Commercial rooftop (average size of 50 KW) – three to six months depending on planning permission requirements^[5].
• Domestic rooftop – three to six months depending on planning permission requirements²¹.

Job roles and skills levels

The job roles required at different project stages depend on the project size and type. Not every type of project will require every job role and the scale of the project will have a significant influence on skills requirements.

The job roles and skills levels at each stage of the project lifecycle relevant to Scotland are considered below. These have been developed based on the expertise of IPTEnergised in delivering solar PV projects for clients^[6]. Inputs and validation were also provided by stakeholders consulted during this study.

Project development

A wide range of job roles are required at the early stages of the project lifecycle, see table below. The breadth of specialisms required is an indicator of the importance of this stage of the process.

*Different types of environmental consultants are required, including: ecological clerk of works, flood risk and drainage specialist, ornithologist, ecologist, hydro/hydrogeo/geologist/peat specialist, noise and vibration specialist, forester.

Ground mounted projects require the broadest range of job roles particularly where the potential environmental impacts of the project need to be considered. For rooftop projects, the services of a skilled structural engineer are crucial to ensure the structural integrity of the building remains intact following system installation. Project developers will, at this stage, commence engagement with the senior authorised person (SAP), a professional that is responsible for the safety of themselves and others working in high voltage areas at the relevant Distribution Network Operator (DNO). They will also engage with DNO engineers and case workers and with relevant planning authorities as required. At this stage, many of the of job roles require the achievement of tertiary education levels, as a minimum and / or a requisite number of years’ experience.

Installation, commissioning and handover

The job roles for the installation, commissioning and handover of a solar project are more focused on construction, with less reliance of specialist consultants and engineers, see Table 3. For ground mounted projects, project management is a key role, typically delivered by an engineering, procurement and construction contractor, and some on-going oversight of potential environmental impacts by an environmental consultant may be required. As before, larger projects, both ground mounted and rooftop commercial, will require ongoing engagement with DNO staff and local authority planners as required. Rooftop projects, specifically, will require an experienced roofing contractor (e.g. slater / tiler). Smaller domestic installations can, typically, be completed by a roofer and an electrician, with limited input required from other job roles.

Operation and maintenance

The emphasis of the job roles associated with this stage of the project lifecycle include, but is not limited to adjustments, repairs, replacements, cleaning and extension of equipment life. For larger ground-based projects this will, typically, be overseen by an asset manager and may require some input from engineering, procurement and construction contractors. Other contractors will be brought in as required. Generally, the main job roles across all three types of projects will be in the electrical field (electricians and high voltage technicians) and for rooftop projects, roofers will be required. At this stage, some of the job roles require the achievement of tertiary education levels, as a minimum and / or a requisite number of years’ experience, see Table 4.

Decommissioning

As discussed above, the solar industry in Scotland is not sufficiently mature for projects to have reached end of life. The job roles and skills levels required for each type of project in Table 5 are, therefore, based on expert judgement.

We note that legal skills may be required at all stages of project lifecycle, most typically for ground-based projects and for larger rooftop projects. This will be to satisfy the requirements for contract negotiations, land purchase, regulatory compliance, and other related legal matters.

Current and future jobs

Current and future jobs numbers by category

The current number of FTE in Scottish solar sector was 800 with the same value reported in LCREE for 2021 and 2022.

To estimate job numbers and roles for 2024-2030 we developed two modelling approaches:

• a top-down model which uses the data on the total employment in the solar sector in 2021 and the installed solar capacity in 2021, and
• a bottom-up model uses IPTEnergised simulated projects (ground-mounted, 50 MW; commercial rooftop, 1 MW; domestic rooftop, 4 KW) and their corresponding FTE requirements.

The top-down model is based on recorded historic data and is aligned with analysis for other renewables sectors. The bottom-up model allows sufficient granularity to generate predictions regarding detailed job roles, information for which is not available in the top-down modelling.

The modelling structure is presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Overview of the data sources, assumptions, and simulations used in the top-down and bottom-up modelling approaches.

The bottom-up model is based on a typical solar project lifecycle, associated job roles and skills levels and a hypothetical solar deployment pathway scenario for Scotland that has been developed for this project. It has not been possible to create an evidence-based deployment scenario as the pipeline of projects that would be required to achieve the proposed ambition of 4-6 GW installed capacity by 2030 does not yet exist. The FTE requirements over the period 2024 – 2030 are dependent on this hypothetical capacity deployment pathway. They could look different under a different capacity deployment scenario.

The initial outputs of the two types of modelling, including assumptions about the deployment pathway, were validated by industry and other stakeholders through interviews and a presentation of the draft study findings at a meeting of the Solar Energy Scotland (the Solar Energy UK Scottish Working Group).

Further details on modelling methodology and data sources are included in Appendix C.

Figure 4 provides an annual overview of the projected FTE requirements by project phase and project type to 2030, on basis of our top-down modelling. Both, construction and O&M activities are predicted to increase steadily throughout this timeframe.

Figure 4: Annual FTE requirements in construction and operation of solar projects, by project type

Our modelling shows demand increasing from an estimated 3,291 FTEs in 2024 to an estimated 11,150 FTE in 2030. The highest workforce demand is expected in construction, particularly for ground-mounted projects. These jobs will be a combination of permanent and temporary roles that will exist for the duration of a project.

O&M jobs will be sustained over a period of time, with staff based on site or in close proximity. A number of the construction jobs will also be permanent, albeit mobile, i.e. involving teams of construction workers moving from site to site.

Further information on how these figures have been estimated is provided in Appendix C.

Using the bottom-up modelling approach, the Table 6 shows the estimated total number of FTEs created each year and the average number of FTEs per year over the seven-year period.

The estimates above are subject to change as the industry experiences ongoing activities in, for example, standardisation of the application process and the rapid changes in policy and consenting processes, as highlighted during discussions with Solar Energy UK.

This modelling approach shows demand increasing from an estimated 1,219 FTEs in 2024 to an estimated 5,848 FTE in 2030.

The average number of FTEs created at the feasibility and constructions stages, over the period 2024 -2030, is estimated at around 1,900. Some of these jobs will be permanent but many will be temporary, mainly appearing during peak construction times. The average number of FTEs created at the O&M stage, over the same period is estimated at around 1,400. Most of these jobs are likely to be sustained beyond 2030.

There will be a particularly high demand for electrical specialists such as electricians, energy yield assessors and grid connection engineers, as these skills are also sought after in other areas of the energy industry. Additionally, the need for construction workers, including civil contractors, general labourers, and operators, will grow quickly to support the building of solar projects.

A detailed breakdown of the estimated job roles by project type and by stage in the project lifecycle is provided in Appendix D.

The FTE job numbers from the top-down model are consistently higher than those from the bottom-up model, although both show similar growth trends. The numbers from the top-down model could, therefore, be interpreted as the upper limit and those from the bottom-up model as the lower limit.

Details of the number of FTE for each job role to deliver 4 GW installed capacity are provided in Appendix C. For this scenario, a further breakdown of jobs into project lifecycle stages was not undertaken, as the 4 GW scenario has not been broken down into ground-mounted, commercial rooftop, and domestic rooftop projects in the way it has for the 6 GW ambition.

Limitations and uncertainties

Results should be interpreted with consideration of the model’s core assumptions, limitations and broader uncertainties in the industry.

The presented models are built on the assumption of workforce intensity per MW installed solar capacity (FTE/MW). This ratio is calculated from LCREE 2021 employment data and a combination of data sources indicating the installed capacity in 2021 (the full methodology is described in the Appendix C). All models assume that the 6 GW installed capacity will be met in 2030.

Mode limitations include the following:

• There are uncertainties associated with the underlying LCREE data, particularly for smaller sectors such as solar PV, where estimates are subject to volatility. Additionally, LCREE estimates are survey-based and gather information from a sample rather than the whole population, meaning that they are subject to sampling uncertainty.
• The top-down model is based on 2021 workforce requirements per MW to estimate future workforce needs. This was the most up to date dataset available at the time this work was undertaken. This approach does not account for potential shifts in workforce efficiency, automation, or technological breakthroughs that could impact the industry.
• The bottom-up model forecasts FTE with total forecasted FTE numbers broken down into specific job roles, acknowledging the short lifespan of some solar projects, especially commercial (< 1 year) and domestic PV (< 1 week) rooftop projects. Although the model normalises the transient jobs in terms of project duration and installed capacity, it is important to recognise that not all FTEs projected by the model will be sustained in the long-term.
• Some jobs will be realised before the start of construction, e.g. those in planning stages of a project, might be realised a year before the construction work. This is particularly relevant for ground-mounted projects. In the absence of information on how quickly different types of projects will move through the planning pipeline, we have assumed in the bottom-up model that FTEs for ground-mounted feasibility stages are created one year before the construction stage. It was not possible to do this for the top-down modelling as the underlying data is not broken down in sufficient detail.

Lastly, the model data should be interpreted in the context of broader developments and uncertainties in the sector that affect the project pipeline.

Predicting the geographical distribution of solar skills demand

Revisiting the REPD, we analysed the pipeline of solar projects awaiting construction and in planning.^[8] This determines the geographical distribution of projects and, therefore, the location of the demand for skills, see Figure 5.

Figure 5: Heat map of solar projects awaiting construction and in planning.

Colour coding: yellow represents a relatively lower concentration of project numbers and red represents a relatively higher concentration of project numbers.

The REPD does not include pipeline data for domestic solar installations. It can be assumed, however, that the majority of domestic installations will be concentrated in the main population centres across the central belt of Scotland, the Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, the East and North East of Scotland and around the Inverness area. This is largely in line with the REPD data in the figure above.

Domestic rooftop installations are expected to require a workforce that is anchored in a particular geographical location, for both construction and O&M project phases, with companies delivering services to local customers. As noted above, this will be concentrated in and around the main clusters of population.

On basis of the current experience in the sector, we expect that construction, installation and commissioning of larger ground-mounted and commercial rooftop systems will require teams of workers moving from site to site around the country. These types of installations may require dedicated O&M staff but numbers are likely to be small, as described previously. The number of ground mounted systems under construction, awaiting construction or for which planning has been submitted is shown in the following figure (analysis of the REPD database – December 2023 data). The figures in brackets indicate the installed capacity in MW.

Figure 6: Number (and MW of installed capacity) of ground mounted systems under construction, awaiting construction or for which planning has been submitted, by council area.

This demonstrates that many of these projects will be located in more rural and less densely populated regions of Scotland where there is availability of land at a size appropriate for larger ground mounted systems. The solar potential of an area is also likely to be an important factor, with the East and South West of Scotland tending to have higher levels of solar potential (Global Solar Atlas, 2024). The projects that will be required to achieve 4-6 GW installed capacity do not yet exist, so it can only be assumed, at this stage, that future projects will be deployed in a similar manner in less densely populated regions.

For many of the development activities at the start of the solar PV project lifecycle, location may not be a concern, as much of this work will be desk-based and can be done from anywhere in the country and, possibly, not even in Scotland.

Solar industry skills demand

Skills challenges

To further clarify the job roles and skills that will be in demand as the industry evolves, we engaged with stakeholders as described in the sections above. One of the strongest messages from stakeholder consultations is that there are significant skills shortages at every level and across each stage of the solar project lifecycle. This was highlighted by nine of the ten stakeholders that provided input and was confirmed by members of Solar Energy Scotland when the initial report findings were presented to them. This is not, however, specific to the solar industry and is being experienced by numerous industry sectors across the UK that rely on engineers and tradespeople. One industry stakeholder noted “there are simply not enough people going into engineering^[9].”

This is leading to widespread problems for companies in attracting and, importantly, retaining staff. Competition for staff is increasing and this, in turn, is driving up costs. The “brain drain” to the south-east of England was also cited by one company stakeholder as a contributing factor with people being attracted by higher salaries and a wider range of job opportunities. This was also validated by members of Solar Energy Scotland at the meeting in Glasgow in March 2024.

Some of the main skills shortages highlighted include electricians, engineers (electrical, structural and civil), roofers, ground-workers and, in general, construction workers. Six of the ten stakeholders consulted highlighted these specific disciplines. This is discussed in more detail in the context of the solar PV project lifecycle below.

Engineering skills

At the first stage of the lifecycle, project development, there is a requirement for engineers and designers that specialise in solar PV systems. Some stakeholders indicated that these are niche roles and many of the relevant degree courses (such as electrical engineering, civil and structural engineering, and architecture), college courses and apprenticeships (electricians and construction) are quite general. This means that people are coming into the industry with good, general, technical skills but do need to undergo further upskilling to meet specific requirements for solar projects. One interviewee said that “the vocational Graduate Apprenticeship Scheme needs to be broadened to include electrical engineering as the current scheme does not support it…we are crying out for this.”

Some companies in the sector (including all five of the company stakeholders consulted) are, therefore, developing these skills in-house either through on-the-job training or, in some cases, by setting up their own skills academies. Extending or modifying existing university courses and apprenticeships to allow some degree of specialisation in renewable energy technologies, including solar, could go some way to addressing this issue. There is also a strong demand for project managers as their skills are very transferable across all renewable energy sectors, not just solar. This was highlighted by one industry association stakeholder that represents companies across the renewable energy sector.

There were no specific skills shortages highlighted in relation to the construction, installation and operation of large ground-mounted solar projects other than the more general UK wide shortages of engineers and tradespeople. Large ground-mounted solar projects are often undertaken by engineering, procurement and construction companies specialising in this type of work. As the number of such projects in the UK, and especially Scotland, is low, the associated workforce tends to be mobile, moving from site to site.

Roofer skills

For both domestic and rooftop projects the chronic shortage of roofers, especially slaters and tilers, both of which are required for solar PV installation, was highlighted by more than 50% of industry stakeholders as well as an industry association consulted during this study. Furthermore, the average age of a competent roofer is over 50 with 60% of the workforce expected to retire in the next five years^[10]. There are not enough people coming into the industry to cover these losses so skills shortages are expected to deteriorate. Roofing skills are, however, essential to undertake an appropriate survey, assess what is possible and install the correct brackets, fixings and panels. One industry association stakeholder commented that diversifying into the installation of solar PV would seem like a logical move for many companies but workforce shortages mean that companies are already overbooked, so the appetite for new opportunities is often limited.

Electrician skills

The other key trade required for rooftop projects is electricians and, again, skills shortages were highlighted by over 50% of the stakeholders consulted. Careful consideration needs to be given, however, when discussing skills, particularly with respect to the installation of solar PV systems in new build properties (domestic or commercial) versus retrofit. At a general level, the electrical skills for both are the same. New build projects, whether housing or commercial, tend to be managed by a lead contractor or project manager that co-ordinates and oversees all activities, including electrical work. This lead contractor should ensure that all construction workers on site have the appropriate level of training and skills required. Retrofitted systems, especially domestic, often will not be project managed and electricians, therefore, need to coordinate with other trades (e.g. roofers) and have overall responsibility for the correct and, more importantly, safe installation and operation of the system. Three company stakeholders and one industry association indicated that this is where some problems can arise, especially if electricians are not trained to appropriate standards and there is little or no oversight of the work they are doing.

Fitting of solar systems, especially in a domestic situation, is not regulated and there is no requirement for engineers or trades to achieve a specified level of training or recognised certification with stakeholders commenting that: “anyone can do it and this leads to quality problems” and that “there is no definition of what a competent installer should be able to do.”

The Microgeneration Certification Scheme (MCS) aims to address some of these issues by working with industry to define, maintain and improve standards for low carbon energy technologies, including solar PV, as well as provide a database of certified contractors. Companies can obtain certification by meeting certain standards which demonstrate their competency but there is no obligation for them to do this.

Planning and distribution network operator skills

Skills shortages in allied sectors (see Appendix B for details) were also cited by three company stakeholders, two industry association stakeholders and during the Solar Energy Scotland meeting as causing issues, which will become more severe as the number, scale and complexity of projects increases. Key job roles for which there are already widespread shortages include DNO engineers and local authority planners. A report published in 2020 (Scottish Renewables, 2020) highlighted that the number of planners employed by councils across Scotland fell by 20% between 2011 and 2020. This shortage of planners, and the resulting delays to the progression of projects that this causes was also highlighted by five of the ten stakeholders consulted, both company and industry association. Furthermore, one company stakeholder and two industry association stakeholders cited the significant shortage of DNO engineers with the required level of competency in solar PV as a major issue, particularly in Scotland where renewable energy generation is much more strongly focused on onshore and offshore wind and hydropower. Skills and competencies have, therefore, developed accordingly.

International solar industry skills strategy development

For the solar PV industry, skills demand is affected by structure of the global supply chain as well as the cross-sectoral nature of installation and maintenance requirements. In 2023, it was estimated that global solar PV employment involved nearly 4.9 million jobs (IRENA, 2023), and almost 40% of workers along the solar PV supply chain require formal training (e.g. electrical engineers and technicians), while 60% require minimal formal training (IRENA, 2021). There is a significant overlap in the skills needed with existing job roles not only across the energy sector, but also in petrochemicals, manufacturing, construction, and other sectors.

The following provides a brief overview of some of the strategies put in place internationally to support the development of the skills in the solar industry.

USA

The USA’s Solar Energy Technologies Office accelerates the advancement and deployment of solar technology to support “an equitable transition to a decarbonised economy” (US Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 2023). It funds solar energy research and development efforts in seven main categories, one of which is solar workforce development. According to the Solar Energy Technologies Office, the US solar workforce will need to grow from approximately 250,000 workers in 2021 to between 500,000 and 1,500,000 workers by 2035. As a result, the Office is funding a range of workforce development initiatives including online and in-person training and education programs, work-based learning opportunities, such as internships and apprenticeships, collegiate competitions, certification programs, and support services such as career counselling, mentorship, and job readiness.

To address the critical need for high-quality and locally accessible training for solar installation, the U.S. Department of Energy established the Solar Training Network (US Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Solar Training Network, 2023). It brings together solar industry representatives, workforce development subject matter experts, diversity group leaders, and other key industry stakeholders to develop and deliver the specialised training needed to meet the demand for skilled workers.

European Union

In May 2022, the European Commission proposed a new strategy, REPowerEU (European Commission, 2023), in response to the energy market disruption caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This includes a target to more than double solar PV capacity to reach 600 GW by 2030, up from 160 GW in 2021. One of its components, the European Solar Rooftop initiative, sets a legal obligation to install solar panels on new buildings, as well as public buildings. Under more ambitious targets of 750 GW and 1 terawatt installed capacity, that Solar Power Europe (Solar Power Europe, 2022) is advocating, solar energy employment could exceed 1 million jobs (457,000 direct + 576,000 indirect) and 1.5 million jobs respectively, as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Solar sector jobs in 2030 to achieve EU installed capacity targets. Adapted from Solar Power Europe 2022

The EU is promoting employment in the solar industry through initiatives such as the Solar Works platform (Solar Power Europe, Solar Works Platform, 2023) which is a combined jobs board and course advertisement resource for those looking to enter the industry. The electrical skills sector is closely collaborating with developments in solar energy as the key element in the solar deployment value chain.

UK and Scotland

The UK British Energy Security Strategy outlines an ambition to increase the solar capacity in the UK from the current 16 GW to 70 GW by 2035 (House of Commons Library, 2023). To develop and drive forward a plan to achieve this target, a government-industry Solar Task Force has been set up. It has established four topic-specific sub-groups, one of which is focused on skills (Solar Energy UK, 2023). This will focus on the development and delivery of the skills and training needed in the solar industry in the short- and long-term.

Options for closing any current or future skills gaps

The general consensus amongst the stakeholders consulted as part of the study was that, in future, the types of skills required will remain much as they are now as the solar PV project lifecycle will, largely, remain the same. The consensus is that the current setup needs to be scaled up. A key message from all stakeholders is that more people with relevant and transferrable skills will need to be attracted into the industry at all levels and across the various job roles. It is likely that many of these individuals will require retraining or upskilling to meet the specific requirements of the solar industry. Given the growth of the sector that will be required to achieve 6 GW of installed capacity and the small size of many of the companies operating in the solar PV industry, especially domestic solar PV, some external support may be required.

Stakeholders indicated, however, that the construction industry, of which the installation of solar PV is considered to be part, is very traditional, conservative and male dominated. It is not considered to be an attractive career option for many people, especially women, despite a number of stakeholders indicating that there should be more focus on attracting women into the industry. Therefore, greater effort is needed to encourage a younger and more diverse workforce to enter the sector. These will be people coming through further and higher education systems via apprenticeships, or certificate, diploma and degree programmes. These individuals will be critical three to four years from now when installation activity will need to ramp up quickly to achieve 6 GW installed capacity. For those entering technical roles, there will be a need to ensure that existing training, apprenticeships and degree programmes are tailored, or new programmes created as appropriate, to meet the needs of the solar PV industry now and in the future. There is a need, therefore, for concerted action to increase the visibility of the sector to individuals in secondary, further and higher education. These are the people that could address potential workforce shortfalls towards the end of this decade and into the 2030s. This may require a more strategic and co-ordinated approach with industry, training providers, schools and relevant government bodies working in partnership to develop interventions to meet the forecast numbers of skilled workers.

In parallel, raising the awareness of the broad range of career opportunities, directly or indirectly associated with the solar PV sector, would be beneficial as an additional means of attracting more people, and especially young people, into the industry. A good example is the Solar Career Map developed by the USA’s Interstate Renewable Energy Council (Interstate Renewable Energy Council, 2024) which covers the broad spectrum of job roles, potential salaries and routes to career progression.

As has been highlighted previously, the UK as a whole, is suffering from engineering related skills shortages and the skills that are in demand in the solar PV sector will also be in demand from other parts of the renewable energy industry and other industries. Many of the stakeholders interviewed during this study indicated skills for solar PV cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation and that a more strategic action is required to understand the number of jobs roles that will be required to meet the targets and ambitions of relevant industries (e.g. installed capacity ambition in renewable energy and house-building targets in construction) and identify those for which there will be competing demands. This would provide a baseline on which future skills development interventions could build.

Conclusions

Based on the evidence gathered during this study, there are significant skilled workforce shortages in Scotland’s solar industry. This applies to all project lifecycle stages. The workforce currently employed in the industry has adequate skills, according to our stakeholder engagement, however, the number of people working in the industry will need to increase rapidly for the deployment of 4 to 6 GW installed capacity aspirations.

If this shortage is not resolved, the impact on the ability to achieve this installed capacity will be significant. This will be further exacerbated by increasing competition for a pool of skilled workforce that is already insufficient to meet demand from both the solar industry and other parts of the renewable energy sector as well as industry sectors, such as construction.

Specific project findings include:

• Delivering 6 GW of solar PV by 2030 could result in the number of jobs expanding from approximately 800 FTE in 2022 (LCREE data) to a maximum of just over 11,000 FTE in 2030. This includes 9,100 FTE for construction related activities, almost 82% of the workforce. Many of these jobs will be temporary and mobile, mainly appearing during peak construction times.
• Operations and maintenance jobs will increase from an estimated 184 FTE in 2024 to an estimated 2,000 FTE in 2030. These job roles are more likely to be permanent and sustained in the following years.
• The pipeline of projects to achieve 6 GW installed capacity does not yet exist, so is it not possible to state definitively the geographical locations that will have the highest additional skills demand. Based on an analysis of the current ground-mounted and commercial rooftop project pipeline (REPD 2023), Aberdeenshire, Angus, Fife and Tayside are the local authorities with the highest expected MW of installed capacity, 54% of the total, and, therefore, will be the areas with the highest demand for construction FTEs and, subsequently, for operations and maintenance FTEs.
• The growth in the number of domestic rooftop installations that will be required to meet the 1.5 GW installed capacity aspiration for this type of projects by 2030 is more likely to result in a construction, installation and maintenance workforce that is anchored in a particular geographical location, with companies delivering services to local customers. This will be concentrated in and around the main clusters of population in Scotland.
• As these skills are also sought after in other parts of the energy and other industries, there will be a particularly high demand for:
• electrical specialists like electricians: 589 FTE by 2030
• grid connection engineers: 394 FTE by 2030
• high voltage technicians: 494 by 2030
• electrical engineers: 132 FTE by 2030.
• The need for the following job roles will increase quickly to support the build of larger solar projects:
• construction workers, including civil contractors: 791 FTE by 2030
• general labourers and operators: 383 FTE by 2030,
• crane operators and lifting contractors: 496 FTE by 2030 and
• roofing contractors: 342 FTE by 2030.

These are also skills that are readily transferable to and in demand from other parts of the renewable energy sector, as well as the construction sector.

• Existing skills shortages in ‘allied sectors’ such as energy system operation, DNOs and local authority planning are causing delays to the planning, approval and construction of solar projects. A combined average of 73 FTE of these allied sector job roles will be required each year to enable solar PV project developments.

Recommendations

Actions to address skills shortages in Scotland will be essential for the success of Scotland’s solar PV industry in its aspiration to achieve 6 GW of installed capacity, as well as for the achievement of Scotland’s broader renewable energy objectives. The development and delivery of these actions should be led by industry, but will require support from and collaboration with schools, colleges, universities, training providers and relevant public sector bodies.

Based on the evidence gathered during this study the suggested actions to address skills challenges include:

• Develop strategies to raise awareness and promote the solar PV industry to attract new entrants. These should highlight the sector’s net zero and sustainability credentials and be designed for primary, secondary, further and higher education students, as well as individuals already in the workforce. These should clearly illustrate the wide range of potential career pathways for individuals at all levels of education, recognising that younger generations, in particular, are far more mobile in the workforce.
• Build on the work that is already being done by, for example, the Solar Task Force skills working group, to design and specify renewable energy and specific solar PV course content. Potential options identified during this study could include:
• a dedicated apprenticeship in renewable energy
• college and university courses such as electrical engineering and apprenticeships, such as electrician and construction, with opportunities to specialise in renewable energy and solar PV system installation.
• extension of the vocational graduate apprenticeship scheme to cover a wider range of subjects, such as electrical engineering.

References

Office for National Statistics (2021). Low Carbon and Renewable Energy Economy (LCREE) Survey. Available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/bulletins/finalestimates/2021

ClimateXChange (2024). Workforce and skills requirements in Scotland’s onshore wind industry. Available at Workforce and skills requirements in Scotland’s onshore wind industry | ClimateXChange

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2023). Renewable Energy Planning Database. Available at https://www.data.gov.uk/dataset/a5b0ed13-c960-49ce-b1f6-3a6bbe0db1b7/renewable-energy-planning-database-repd

The Microgeneration Certification Scheme Installations Database (2023). Available at https://certificate.microgenerationcertification.org/

Solar Energy Scotland (2023). Scotland’s fair share: Solar’s role in achieving net zero in Scotland. Available at https://solarenergyuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/1SES-Scotlands-fair-share-FINAL-PDF-Version.pdf

Scottish Parliament, Net Zero, Energy and Transport Committee (2023). Available at https://www.parliament.scot/-/media/files/committees/net-zero-energy-and-transport-committee/correspondence/2023/solar-ambition-for-scotland-28-october-2023.pdf

International Energy Agency (2023). More information available at https://www.iea.org/energy-system/renewables/solar-pv

International Energy Agency (2023). Renewables 2023 analysis and forecast to 2028. Available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/96d66a8b-d502-476b-ba94-54ffda84cf72/Renewables_2023.pdf

International Energy Agency (2022). Special report on solar PV global supply chains. Available at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/d2ee601d-6b1a-4cd2-a0e8-db02dc64332c/SpecialReportonSolarPVGlobalSupplyChains.pdf

Scottish Land and Estates, 2023. More information available at https://www.scottishlandandestates.co.uk/helping-it-happen/case-studies

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2023). UK energy in brief. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6581cb5aed3c34000d3bfbfc/UK_Energy_in_Brief_2023.pdf

M Sodhia, L Banaszeka, C Mageeb, M Rivero-Hude, “Economic lifetimes of solar panels”, 29th CIRP Life cycle engineering conference, 2022

Changeworks (2024). More information available at https://www.changeworks.org.uk/energy-advice/heat-your-home-efficiently/renewable-energy/solar-panels/#:~:text=our%20insulation%20guides.-,Solar%20panels%20in%20Scotland%3F,to%20power%20around%2090%2C000%20homes

Engineering and Technology (2023). Government urged to plug STEM skills gap at earliest school age. More information available at https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2021/11/engineering-and-tech-giants-join-forces-to-stem-15bn-annual-skills-gap/#:~:text=In%20June%20this%20year%2C%20the,per%20business%20in%20the%20UK

Global Solar Atlas (2024). More information available at https://globalsolaratlas.info/map?c=56.736658,-5.705568,6&s=54.863963,-4.614258&m=site

Scottish Renewables (2020). Planning logjam ‘threatens net-zero’, renewable energy industry warns. More information available at https://www.scottishrenewables.com/news/736-planning-logjam-threatens-net-zero-renewable-energy-industry-warns

IRENA (2023). Renewable energy and jobs annual review 2023. Available at https://mc-cd8320d4-36a1-40ac-83cc-3389-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Sep/IRENA_Renewable_energy_and_jobs_2023.pdf?rev=4c35bf5a1222429e8f0bf932a641f818

IRENA (2021). Renewable energy and jobs annual review 2021. Available at https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Oct/Renewable-Energy-and-Jobs-Annual-Review-2021

US Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (2023). More information available at https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/solar-energy-technologies-office

US Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (2023). Solar Training Network. More information available at https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/solar-training-network

European Commission (2023). REPowerEU sustainable energy strategy (2022). Available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en

Solar Power Europe (2022). More information available at https://www.solarpowereurope.org/

Solar Power Europe (2023). #SolarWorks job platform. More information available at https://www.solarworksplatform.org/nl

EuropeOn (2021). Powering green jobs growth with electrical contractors: the job potential of electric renovations and prosumer installations. Available at https://europe-on.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/EuropeOn_Job-Potential-Study-2021_Public.pdf

House of Commons Library (2023). Planning and solar farms. More information available at https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2023-0168/

Solar Energy UK (2023). Solar taskforce drives forward on grid access, supply chain, skills and the rooftop market. More information available at https://solarenergyuk.org/news/solar-taskforce-drives-forward-on-grid-access-supply-chain-skills-and-the-rooftop-market/

Interstate Renewable Energy Council (2024). Solar Career Map. More information available at https://www.irecsolarcareermap.org/

Local Government Associations (2023). Available at https://www.local.gov.uk/about/news/1300-clean-power-projects-permission-awaiting-construction-say-councils

National Grid (2020). Available at https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/126256/download

Scottish Government (2023). More information available at https://www.gov.scot/policies/energy-infrastructure/energy-consents/

The MJ (2023). Available at https://www.themj.co.uk/Addressing-the-great-local-government-recruitment-crisis/230614

Scottish Government, 2021). More information available at https://www.gov.scot/publications/householder-permitted-development-rights-guidance-updated-2021/pages/6/

Solar Energy UK (2024). Reported on at https://solarenergyuk.org/scottish-government-eases-planning-restrictions-for-solar-energy/

Office for National Statistics (2021). Available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/bulletins/finalestimates/2021

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2023). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/solar-photovoltaics-deployment

Appendix / Appendices

Appendix A – Stakeholder consultation process

In total, ten stakeholders were consulted as part of this study to obtain their insights on current workforce needs and how they might change in the future. The organisations that provided input are shown in the table below.

The interview structure approved by the project steering group and used to guide the stakeholder discussions, is as follows:

• Lifecycle of a solar installation project: could you talk us through the typical lifecycle of a solar installation project and the key workforce needs at each stage?
• Project-specific workforce requirements: for your current and upcoming projects, what specific job roles and skills levels are a priority for you?
• Workforce composition and numbers: what does the workforce composition look like in terms of job roles and numbers for a typical solar project (rooftop installation versus ground-based project)?
• Skill level assessment: how are the skill levels required for various job roles assessed for each installation or project?
• Skills gaps: are there any skills shortages or gaps being faced by the industry currently? If yes, in which job categories and which geographic areas
• In-house training: What, if any, training is provided in-house, including existing apprenticeship programmes
• Attracting and retaining talent: if you are an employer, do you experience recruitment difficulties for any specific roles?
• Future demand for skills: what skills will be required to achieve the proposed ambition of 4-6 GW of solar capacity by 2030 and what is the likely demand for these skills (i.e. to what size will the workforce grow)? Do you predict any changes in a typical lifecycle of a solar project that would require new/different skills?
• New skills: are there any challenges or changes in the solar industry that are creating demand for new skills or new job roles?
• Competition for skills: is there competition for skills from other industries or from other parts of the UK / Europe? Is the solar industry in Scotland attracting skills from elsewhere? Are there any synergies between the workforce in solar and other sectors (e.g., electrical)?
• Skills development and training: Are universities, colleges and vocational training institutes delivering skills development and training required by the industry? What role can they play in addressing any skill gaps identified?

In addition, the draft findings of this study were presented to members of Solar Energy Scotland, the Scottish working group of Solar Energy UK, at a meeting held in Glasgow in March 2024. At this meeting, further insight into skills requirements now and in the future were provided with additional written feedback provided by email.

Appendix B – Solar Industry Context

This section explores policies and skills demands in allied sectors that will influence the development of the Scottish solar industry.

Electricity System Operation

Electricity system operation (ESO) in the UK is undergoing rapid change as it responds to an exponential increase in pressures associated with planning and operating the UK’s gas and electricity networks as the number and complexity of electricity projects increases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the waiting time for renewable energy projects to be connected to the grid is, currently, extending into the late 2030s(Local Government Association, 2023).

Seven of the nine individual stakeholders contacted during this study highlighted that the delays to grid connection is the main bottleneck in the industry and is the one issue that is most likely to impact on the deployment of solar PV. Without a strong pipeline of projects progressing through planning and onto construction and operation, jobs will not be created.

In 2020, the National Grid estimated that across their activities, the future energy workforce requirements to 2050 will include approximately 400,000 FTE, of which 260,000 will be an additional demand (i.e. an increase in the overall workforce requirements) and 140,000 will be replacing those leaving the workforce, for example, by retiring (National Grid, 2020). Of these jobs, 48,700 will be based in Scotland. The report highlights the appetite for data, digital, and engineering skills (at technician and graduate levels). Very little has been reported, however, on the upstream skills requirements, including preparation of the regulatory documentation (e.g., Data Registration Code), review of the documentation, environmental skills and competencies, and other enablers of project compliance. Stakeholders consulted during this study, however, have highlighted the challenges being faced by companies across the renewables energy sector, not just solar PV, due to staff shortages at the National Grid and other distribution network operators. One company stakeholder commented “the biggest barrier is the grid.”

Consenting bodies

Electricity generation with a capacity exceeding 50 MW must be submitted to the Scottish Government’s Energy Consents Unit for consideration by Scottish Ministers. Those below 50 MW are authorised by the local planning authority (Scottish Government, 2023).

The REPD database (data extracted for December 2023) shows that there were only four project applications made to the Energy Consents Unit, two of which have been granted planning permission and are awaiting construction. The remaining two are still awaiting planning permission. This means that the bulk of applications must go through local planning authorities and, as far back as 2020, Scottish Renewables was highlighting a renewable energy planning ‘log jam’ that could jeopardise Scotland’s net zero targets. This issue was detailed in a report (Scottish Renewables, 2020) that concluded this issue was, in part, due to the increasing number of planning applications being submitted at the same time as a fall in the number of planners employed by councils across Scotland – 20% between 2011 and 2020 – when this Scottish Renewables report was published. Many of the stakeholders consulted during this study also highlighted this as an issue. Quotes from the interviewees include: “local authority planners are totally stretched,” and “it can take two to three months to get a response from planning and then another two to three months to get a building warrant. This has a major impact on workflows.” Councils are also known to struggle with hiring and retention of staff (The MJ, 2023).

The REPD database (December 2023) includes information relating to when planning applications are submitted and, subsequently, when planning permission is granted. For commercial rooftop projects the data shows that this ranges from four weeks to seven months with the majority being in the range two to three months, which reflects the comments made by stakeholders.

In Scotland, the installation of rooftop projects can be done under permitted development if they meet a set of rules covering minor modifications or improvements made to the outside of homes and commercial buildings. The Scottish Government has produced guidelines (Scottish Government, 2021) on householder permitted development rights and what can be built without submitting a planning application. Any domestic installations that do not meet these rules will require planning permission.

On March 28^th 2024 a statutory instrument was put before the Scottish Parliament announcing new measures to help simplify the planning rules (Solar Energy UK, 2024). Amongst the most significant changes are:

• A proposal to remove the current 50 kW limit for permitted development on rooftop solar installations. Currently, any rooftop solar PV installation of 50 kW (approx. 220m²) or greater, must be subject to a full planning application.
• Solar PV installation in conservation areas can be a permitted development under certain circumstances, such as not on primary elevations or facing roads.
• Flat roof solar PV systems can be installed under permitted development provided they do not protrude more than one meter from the roof surface.

These changes are considered to be a significant step forward, streamlining the processes and making it easier to design and install solar PV systems.

Appendix C – Modelling methodology

Background

The top-down model was built using LCREE Survey estimates for the UK between 2014 and 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2021) that provides FTE job estimates per country and per Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code in relation to the solar sector. Therefore, the solar employment in SIC D: Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply was used as a proxy measure for the number of FTEs in solar project operation and installation in Scotland and SIC F: Construction to estimate the number of FTEs in construction. It is noted that SIC codes are not broken down at a Scotland level so it was assumed that the UK breakdown applies to Scotland. Using the REPD 2021, the capacity (MWelec) in construction and in operation in the solar sector for ground-mounted and commercial rooftop projects was calculated. The datasets describing the sector’s activity in 2021 were used as these were the most recent available at the time of the preparation of this report (LCREE 2022 was released in March 2024), and to allow the comparability with the parallel study focusing on the economic activity and skills requirements of the onshore wind sector (ClimateXChange, 2024). The overview of the data sources and outputs of the models are presented in the main body of the report.

The cumulative MWelec of domestic rooftop projects was estimated using the solar PV deployment database(Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2023) and the MCS installations database. These official data sources then yielded the core assumptions of FTE/MWelec in construction and FTE/MWelec in the operation of solar energy projects.

We used REPD data (ground-mounted and commercial rooftop) and MSC data (domestic rooftop) to estimate installed solar capacity in 2021-2023 and the assumption that 6 GW total installed capacity will be met in 2030. The capacity increase between 2023 and 2030 was proportionately divided into three fractions as follows:

• 20% in 2025-2026
• 30% in 2027-2028
• 50% in 2028-2030.

This forecast served as a hypothetical deployment pipeline as the project pipeline to achieve 6 GW of installed capacity does not yet exist. Subsequently, the FTE requirements over the period 2024 – 2030 are entirely dependent on this hypothetical capacity deployment pathway. They could look differently under a different capacity deployment scenario. To note, the prediction for installed capacity in 2024 is based on the sum of already operational projects and projects in construction in 2023.

We used the 2019-2023 REPD data as the industry’s past performance measure and the 6 GW as the assumed capacity in 2030. This was broken down as follows: 3.5 GW ground-mounted, 1.5 GW domestic rooftop, and 1 GW from commercial rooftop. In consultation with technical experts from ITPEnergised, a possible scenario for the installed capacity increase was predicted. The overall workforce requirements in construction and operation of solar projects were then calculated on an annual basis.

For the bottom-up modelling we used the in-house expertise of IPTEnergised and input provided by stakeholders to develop a jobs matrix that describes the stages of a typical solar project across the three project types (ground-mounted, commercial rooftop and domestic rooftop) in terms of FTE requirements. We then modelled how workforce requirements in each job role could increase in the context of the forecasted installed capacity.

Top-down modelling of solar capacity increase and total FTE forecast

The assumptions to top down modelling are presented in Figure 8 and described in section 11.3.1.

Capacity increase model	FTE

Bottom-up modelling of job roles and total FTE demands

As indicated previously, conventional bottom-up modelling for the economic activity forecast in the sector is not feasible due to the fact that the projects that will enable a 6 GW deployment are not yet in the development pipeline. As a result, a typical solar project and its workforce requirements have been simulated, based on the following assumptions:

Using the in-house expertise of IPTEnergised, an established project developer, the job roles required for each project type and at each project stage of the project lifecycle were defined and an estimate made of the FTE for each job role by project type. The number of projects necessary to achieve the 3.5 GW ground-mounted, 1.5 GW domestic rooftop and 1 GW commercial rooftop capacities were calculated and the number of FTEs multiplied accordingly. In the absence of robust information on how quickly different types of projects will move through the planning pipeline, we have assumed that FTEs for ground-mounted feasibility stages are created one year before the construction stage.

Where possible, the job roles and FTE calculations were validated during the stakeholder interview process. In this way, heat maps have been created that illustrate potential workforce requirements across different project types and stages. The heatmap for 6 GW installed capacity is shown in the main body of the report. The heatmap for the 4 GW installed capacity is shown below.

The full selection of heat maps by project type can be found in Appendix D. This is for 6 GW installed capacity only. As the 4 GW capacity has not been broken down by ground-mounted, commercial rooftop and domestic rooftop in the same way as the 6 GW capacity, it was not possible to undertake the same level of modelling and analysis, including modelling of one-year lag time between the realisation of FTEs associated with ground-mounted feasibility and construction stages.

Top-down and bottom-up model convergence

Two modelling approaches were developed that sought to:

• Predict the total annual FTE that could enable the delivery of 6 GW solar installed capacity in the timeframe 2024 – 2030.
• Estimate the job roles and their FTE requirements on annual basis.

The FTE job numbers calculated using the top-down modelling approach are consistently higher that the FTE job numbers calculated using the bottom-up modelling approach, although both show similar growth trends. The numbers from the top-down model could, therefore, be interpreted as the upper limit and those from the bottom-up model as the lower limit.

The breakdown into annual FTEs is shown in the figure below.

Figure 9: Workforce Requirements – Comparing the Two Modelling Approaches (FTE)

Appendix D – Workforce requirements by project type and at each stage of the project lifecycle

The following heatmaps show the number and types of jobs required annually to 2030, broken down by project type and at each stage of the project lifecycle. Decommissioning has not been included as solar systems have not yet reached this stage of the lifecycle in Scotland and it is not, therefore, possible to estimate job numbers with any certainty. As noted above, this is only possible for 6 GW capacity as the 4 GW capacity has not been broken down into the different project types.

Ground mounted projects – 6 GW installed capacity

Table 9: Ground mounted projects – 6 GW installed capacity scenario, FTE requirements by job role

Domestic rooftop projects – 6 GW capacity

© The University of Edinburgh, 2024.
Prepared by Optimat and ITPEnergised on behalf of ClimateXChange, The University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

If you require the report in an alternative format such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

1. 
   

   This estimate comes from data extracted from the Renewable Energy Planning Database (REPD) (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2023), which covers ground-based projects and commercial roof-top installations of 100 kilowatts (KW) and above, and the Microgeneration Certification Scheme installations database (Microgeneration Certification Scheme, 2023), which covers most domestic rooftop installations. ↑

   
   
2. 
   

   REPD states that a project that does not require planning permission has been announced by the developer. ↑

   
   
3. 
   

   PVs will continue to generate power after the 25-30 year lifetime duration, but performance and efficiency are likely to decline (M Sodhia, L Banaszeka, C Mageeb, M Rivero-Hude, 2022) ↑

   
   
4. 
   

   Information provided by ITPEnergised based on the company’s experience of delivering large scale ground-mounted PV solar projects ↑

   
   
5. 
   

   Information provided by industry stakeholders involved in the installation of commercial and domestic rooftop projects consulted during this study ↑

   
   
6. 
   

   This includes the provision of environmental and energy consulting services; solar design services for both ground and roof mounted solar PV; yield assessments and due diligence services. ↑

   
   
7. 
   

   HNC: Higher National Certificate, HND: Higher National Diploma, GWO: Global Wind Organisation ↑

   
   
8. 
   

   This includes projects for which the planning application was originally rejected and an appeal subsequently lodged ↑

   
   
9. 
   

   Technical skills shortages are long-standing issues, with a shortfall of over 173,000 workers identified in science, technology, engineering and maths disciplines in 2021 (Engineering and Technology, 2023). ↑

   
   
10. 
    

    Information provided during an interview with an industry association stakeholder consulted as part of this study. ↑

    
    

This research was a rapid review presenting and examining evidence relating to climate change and digital connectivity such as:

• whether investment in digital connectivity can support reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and, if so, how
• examples of relevant policies and impacts
• the best options for assessing emissions from digital connectivity and services in Scotland
• key evidence gaps in these areas.

Summary of findings

The research team has found mixed evidence of the decarbonisation impact of digital connectivity and whether it contributes to adaptation and a just transition. The main findings, based on the literature reviewed are:

• The Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector is a source of GHG emissions.
• ICT technology and digitalisation reduce GHG emissions in other industries.  
• The GHG emissions associated with e-waste are of growing concern internationally.
• The indirect impact of ICT technologies can either lead to a net reduction in carbon emissions or to a net increase. Human behaviour plays a part in whether the indirect impacts on emissions are positive or negative.
• We are unable to say whether digital connectivity supports climate adaptation. With regard to a just transition, digital connectivity and ICT can have either a positive or a negative effect.

For more detailed information about the findings, please read the report.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4346

Executive summary

Aims

This research is a rapid review, presenting and examining evidence relating to climate change and digital connectivity such as:

• whether investment in digital connectivity can support reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and, if so, how
• examples of relevant policies and impacts
• the best options for assessing emissions from digital connectivity and services in Scotland
• key evidence gaps in these areas.

The review was undertaken between October and the middle of December 2023 and was focused on and bounded by specific criteria set out by the Scottish Government and ClimateXChange steering group. The study team were asked to only include information and projects that were current and operating, not theoretical. Search terms were selected and agreed with the steering group.

We used a methodology known as “claim, argument, evidence” to assess whether claims made within certain arguments were true or false. We classified evidence as having low, moderate or good confidence levels, based on its volume and quality, and the level of agreement in the literature reviewed.

Findings

We have found mixed evidence of the decarbonisation impact of digital connectivity and whether it contributes to adaptation and a just transition. Our main findings on basis of the literature reviewed are:

• The Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector is a source of GHG emissions. The sector’s energy consumption and generation of electronic waste (e-waste) generates GHG emissions directly. This is despite the possibility that it can reduce emissions indirectly by increasing efficiency and through behaviour changes like reduced travel due to remote meetings. Studies point out a need for a holistic approach in calculating GHG emissions of the ICT sector, to fully account for indirect emissions and emissions from end-of-life.
• ICT technology and digitalisation reduce GHG emissions in other industries. Heavy industry and the energy sector would benefit the most from digitalisation. To achieve this, there would need to be widespread high-speed internet coverage, which would likely generate further GHG emissions. On their own, digital connectivity infrastructures do not support emissions reduction. They provide a mechanism to support decarbonisation of other sectors.
• The GHG emissions associated with e-waste are of growing concern internationally. Even though ICT use could help reduce GHG emissions in other sectors, it is uncertain whether this can outweigh the direct emissions of the ITC sector. It gives us only moderate confidence that the ICT sector can help reduce more emissions than are inherent in the manufacture, use and disposal of the equipment used.
• The indirect impact of ICT technologies can either lead to a net reduction in carbon emissions or to a net increase. The overall effects depend on context. Rebound effects can lead to increases in emissions. Policy and measurement do not usually account for these effects. Human behaviour plays a part in whether the indirect impacts on emissions are positive or negative. This means that it is not solely down to technology and therefore we are only moderately confident that the challenge of emissions reduction can solely be met by utilising digital technology.
• We are unable to say whether digital connectivity supports climate adaptation because of the small number of ex-post studies in this area. With regard to a just transition, digital connectivity and ICT can have either a positive or a negative effect, either addressing or exacerbating existing inequalities such as access to digital connectivity and skills. Studies repeat the need for strong policy in this area.

Within the literature reviewed as part of the study, we identified gaps in knowledge, including:

• Lack of evidence on whether investment in digital connectivity directly reduces GHG emissions, or contributes to a just transition and how.
• There are varying approaches to quantifying direct and indirect emissions of ICT and to comparing the GHG emissions of digital and non-digital practices and solutions.
• Climate adaptation in relation to ICT is either an afterthought or future looking, with few real-world examples.
• Case studies of digital technologies saving money, power or water in municipalities focused on the GHG emissions reduced or averted, with no acknowledgment of rebound effects, which literature states is important.
• The GHG emissions of data collection and use necessary to digitalisation are opaque and limited to specific studies on data centres.
• Lack of evidence of policy to address GHG emissions of e-waste or the embedded emissions from extraction of raw materials and production of ICT equipment.
• Lack of best practice for measuring, monitoring and assessing the GHG footprint of electronic communications services.

Glossary

Introduction

Need for this research

The extent to which the development and deployment of digital and data solutions supports the reduction of a country’s greenhouse gas footprint, assists in adaptation, and contributes to a just transition is unclear. Digital technologies have become an integral part of our lives, but they also have an environmental impact, including the production of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) during their manufacturing, use and disposal.

In recent years, over £1 billion has been invested in programmes to enhance digital connectivity in Scotland, for a variety of anticipated outcomes relating to regional equity and opportunity. These include Digital Scotland Superfast Broadband (DSSB), Reaching 100% (R100), Scottish 4G Infill (S4GI), and the Scotland 5G Centre, with a regional network of 5G Innovation Hubs to facilitate widespread deployment of 5G.

Digital connectivity, and increasing access to it, is the focus of many Scottish Government policies. The Digital Strategy, ‘A changing nation: how Scotland will thrive in a digital world,’ is the policy backbone, setting out actions on: broadband and connectivity; data and statistics; digital inclusion and ethics; digital, data and technology profession, skills and capability; Transforming public services; and the Technology Assurance Framework. Enhancing Scotland’s digital infrastructure, both nationally and internationally, has also been a stated priority in successive Programmes for Government and the 10-year National Strategy for Economic Transformation (NSET) published in 2022. There is a lack of current evidence on the extent of the potential contribution of digital connectivity to Scotland’s climate change goals, not least of achieving net zero by 2045.

Project aim

The aim of the project is to examine recent research on climate change and digital connectivity to answer the following questions:

• To what extent is there evidence that investment in digital connectivity can support emissions reduction, climate adaptation and a just transition?
• If so, what are the key mechanisms by which this could occur (for example, reduction in travel, investment in green data centres or other mechanisms suggested in the evidence)?
• What are key examples of existing policies (in Scotland, such as in Local Authorities, the UK and/or international examples from comparable countries) designed to support emission reductions, adaptation, and/ or just transition through digital connectivity? Is there any evidence for the impact of such policies?
• What are the different options suggested within the literature for Scotland to provide a baseline assessment of, and monitor carbon emissions from digital infrastructure, technologies, and associated activities?
• What are the other key gaps in existing knowledge where further research is required to support digital connectivity and Scotland’s climate change goals?

These questions are answered in Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. By better understanding the mechanisms in which digital connectivity supports Scotland reaching net zero, policy makers will know how to influence what they want to occur.

Key terms used throughout the report are explained in the Glossary in Section 2.

Components of the digital landscape covered by this research

The focus of the research is digital connectivity. This can encompass a wide range of products and services. Figure 1 sets out the boundaries of the research undertaken to inform this paper, including:

• infrastructure such as fixed broadband, mobile connectivity and data centres
• application, use and behaviours such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things, data driven products and services, and practices such as home working
• the list of countries with applicable learning for Scotland.

Figure 1 – The landscape of digital connectivity defined as within scope of this research.

Approach to the research

This section provides an overview of the research approach. Our full methodology is outlined in Appendix 1.

Methodology for collecting evidence

Frazer-Nash Consultancy (Frazer-Nash) was tasked with completing this research for ClimateXChange (CxC) on behalf of the Scottish Government Digital Connectivity Division. A steering group was set up consisting of representatives from Scottish Government, CxC and Frazer-Nash.

We followed an approach based on the Double Diamond approach of Discovery and Define^[1], including literature gathering, revising and providing initial conclusions, and further developing conclusions before developing the report. We socialised the initial and final conclusions with the steering group. Keywords for the literature search were also agreed with the steering group. The literature reviewed was identified through google and google scholar searches. The review was focused on and limited by specific criteria, such as the non-inclusion of theoretical studies around “what is possible”, with an emphasis on current and recent experience.

Methodology for policy review

One of our research questions requests a review of policies which were designed to support emission reductions, adaptation or just transition through digital connectivity. To determine the geographic scope of the research, we chose countries analogous to Scotland facing similar digital connectivity challenges, that is, large landmasses with areas of low population density, and a number of isolated and rural remote communities. This list was agreed with the steering group and consists of: Finland, Wales, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Canada (Ontario), New Zealand, Denmark, and Iceland.

We use a star key (Table 3) to rate the extent that digital connectivity and emissions reduction are linked within a country’s policy.

Section 7 sets out the policies we found and reviewed.

How we have presented our findings

By following this methodology, we came up with a series of statements based on the findings from our research. These are presented in Section 5 and 6 with a structure as follows:

• Claim: a conclusion formatted in bold and accompanied by a statement of confidence in our conclusion.
• Argument: concise statements explaining how we arrived at the conclusion.
• Evidence: synthesis of literature in support of our argument.

We have provided a confidence level based on the extent of agreement in the literature and the robustness of evidence. We follow a methodology similar to the one developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the fifth assessment report and used for the sixth for the consistent treatment of uncertainties.

Figure 2 sets out what constitutes low, moderate, and good confidence in our claims.

Low agreement is where sources do not agree.

Medium agreement is where sources make broadly similar conclusions but the data or evidence they use to support their conclusions are very different.

High agreement is where sources independently make similar conclusions and underlying data are similar despite being independent.

Limited evidence is some evidence available but largely anecdotal and not from recognised peer reviewed sources. Availability of data was low.

Medium evidence is information from peer reviewed sources or official sources.

Robust evidence is a greater volume of information from peer reviewed sources and official sources.

The combination of low agreement and limited evidence provides the lowest level of confidence and the combination of high agreement and robust evidence provides a good level of confidence, with combinations in-between generating moderate confidence.

Our definitions for “limited”, “medium” and “robust” evidence are described in Appendix 1: Detailed Methodology & Approach to the Research. This means that when we say we have “good confidence” in a finding, we are content that there is medium to high agreement in the literature and medium to robust evidence provided for that claim.

Figure 2 – How extent of literature agreement and evidence robustness combines into our stated confidence level.

Investment in digital connectivity and emissions reduction

Digital connectivity, technologies and GHG emissions

We have good confidence in the evidence that, taken on its own, digital connectivity and digital technologies are sources of GHG emissions.

Digital connectivity enables a range of ICT applications. The underlying infrastructure that makes it all work often gives rise to GHG emissions. It depends on the structure of the primary energy and electricity generation sectors of the countries where ICT goods are produced and used, as well as the materials used, such as plastic. These emissions arise across communication equipment such as fixed and mobile broadband, datacentres, cables, and the computers or devices themselves.

The ICT sector is responsible for around 3% to 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions (UNEP, 2021). In Scotland, using domestic output and supply and the environmental input-output model greenhouse gas effects data, the sector contributes around 2% of direct and indirect emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent^[2]. It is also true that regions and countries with higher levels of digital economy development have higher GHG emissions (Wang, et al., 2023). Between 1995 and 2015, GHG emissions of ICT manufacturing have doubled and demand for materials to develop more ICT equipment has quadrupled in the same time period (Itten, et al., 2020).

Besides the high-energy consumption of ICT and electronic equipment, many energy-intensive infrastructures such as backhaul and data centres need to be built to achieve digital connectivity (Lin & Huang, 2023). This means that GHG emissions will increase as a country or region digitalises, up to a certain point (explored further in section 5.1.2). On their own, digital connectivity infrastructures do not support emissions reduction. They provide a mechanism to support decarbonisation of other sectors.

Digital connectivity, emissions reduction and other economic sectors

We have good confidence in the evidence that digital connectivity can only support emissions reduction when paired with other economic sectors.

Digital connectivity is hailed as an enabler for decarbonisation. Despite being a source of GHG emissions themselves, they enable other sectors to digitise in ways that improve productivity and efficiency. The mechanisms by which this is achieved are explored more in Section 6. Essentially, ICT products and services allow traditional industry to change their methodologies to curb GHG emissions (Wang, et al., 2023). Many policymakers hope that the reduction in GHG emissions achieved by these sectors will outweigh the ICT sector’s emissions, as suggested by the European Commission, which states: “If properly governed, digital technologies can help create a climate neutral, resource-efficient economy and society, cutting the use of energy and resources in key economic sectors and becoming more resource-efficient themselves. When implemented under the right conditions, digital solutions have demonstrated significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, increased resource efficiency and improved environmental monitoring.” (European Commission, 2022)

Many policies are reliant upon a viewpoint that, on balance, digital innovation to reduce GHG emissions will outweigh the emissions cost of producing and maintaining the necessary ICT networks and components. It is less common for papers to acknowledge there is an initial increase in GHG emissions (particularly from energy use) at the onset of digitalisation. Nor are there many papers discussing the point at which digitalisation starts to reduce emissions.

Lin &Huag is another paper that does address this issue (Lin & Huang, 2023). They state that with increased digitalisation, the resulting increased digital connectivity meant that an energy saving effect could be scaled up across the economy. This marginal energy saving effect exceeds energy consumption of the system – this could be seen as the point at which the GHG savings which result from efficiencies outweigh the GHG emissions from the energy use, production of devices and so on involved in digitalisation. Lin and Huang refer to this point as ‘digitalisation level 0.43’ (Lin & Huang, 2023). The digitalisation level indicator used in the paper is based on data on digital infrastructure, such as internet access and bandwidth, digital application, e.g. fixed and mobile subscription and digital skills and on aggregate ranges from 0 to 100%, using a weighted average for the component elements of the indicator. The paper stipulates that most developed countries have passed the 0.43 point, and it is reasonable to assume that this is the case for Scotland. The assumption of the inverted U-shaped relationship is well tested in the paper, see image in Figure 4. However, the slope of the downward curve is not specified and therefore the applicability of the analysis to Scotland is uncertain, however it is likely to depend on other factors such as the structure of the economy. (Lin & Huang, 2023) make no comment on obsolescence or upgrades to physical equipment.

Figure 4 – Country-level energy intensity against digitalisation; adapted from (Lin & Huang, 2023).

Paired with industrial sectors, there is therefore good evidence that digital connectivity supports emission reductions.

Indirect impacts from ICT use on GHG emissions

We have good confidence in the evidence that indirect impacts from ICT use can be both positive and negative for GHG emissions.

ICT can have both increasing and decreasing effects on GHG emissions. These can be direct or indirect. Direct impacts include energy consumption while the device is in use. Indirect impacts include secondary benefits such as more people being able to work from home and associated reduction in commuting emissions. While digital connectivity can reduce transport through, for example, hosting virtual meetings, some studies postulate that it could also increase emissions from transport by creating the desire to travel to places seen on the internet (Bieser and Hilty, 2018; Hilty and Bieser, 2017; Wang, et al, 2023). Many studies which look at quantifying both, the direct and indirect effects of ICT use, often conclude that the indirect effects are favourable (i.e., reducing GHG emissions) and far outweigh direct effects of energy use. However, these studies often neglect factors such as stimulating transport demand, rebound effects, behaviour changes of humans using these systems, or the embedded carbon of the product or service (Itten, et al., 2020).

The CxC study on emissions impact of home working in Scotland found a small reduction in commuting and office emissions and an increase in home emissions. However, how these changes in emissions balance for each individual defines the net emissions impact from homeworking (Riley, et al., 2021).

Therefore, we conclude from the literature reviewed, that the evidence remains divided in which is more significant: increasing or decreasing effects on GHG emissions.

Emissions reduction and digital technologies that rely on connectivity

We have good confidence in the evidence that the challenge of emissions reduction cannot be met without digital technologies that rely on connectivity.

A great number of the studies and policies we read stated strongly that the challenge of emissions reduction and climate adaptation will not be met without the intervention or use of digital technology and tools (including Royal Society, 2020; Exponential Roadmap Initiative, 2023). The three technologies most often hailed as transformative to all sectors of the economy are 5G, the Internet of Things (IoT, connected devices pooling data often in real time for decision-making) and artificial intelligence (AI, computer-based machine learning).

Many papers assert that digital technology has the potential to assist the transition to a low carbon world, enabling global emission reductions while limiting the emissions created by ICT use (Royal Society, 2020). Some claim that if the currently available digital solutions were used at scale, there would be the potential to reduce GHG emissions in the three highest-emitting global sectors (energy, materials, and mobility) by 20% by 2050 (World Economic Forum, 2022). There was no concrete evidence in these papers that connectivity would enable these goals to be met, only claims.

Sectors that will benefit the most from digital connectivity

We have good confidence in the evidence that suggests that the sectors that will most benefit from digital connectivity are industrial in nature and will vary from country to country.

The sources above state the energy sector would benefit the most from digital solutions. In Scotland, the energy sector is the fourth highest emitter at 4.9 million tonnes of CO₂e in 2021 (Scottish Government, 2021). With regards to electricity in particular, the complexity and scale of integrating more renewable energy generation and increasing the distribution capacity of the electricity grid will not be possible without digital technologies (Energy Systems Catapult, 2023), especially with increasing requirements for data sharing and more effective system planning and operation. Renewable generation is intermittent and requires active grid management. Digital technologies can help balance the supply side (electricity producers) and the demand side (consumers) management for a more agile, stable and reliable electricity grid for industrial, commercial and household users.

The industry sector is globally responsible for 37% of total final energy consumption and about 20% of GHG emissions. In Scotland, industrial processes and business account for 20% of CO₂e in 2021.

As described in 5.1.4, digital technologies will be important to manage the supply and demand of large industrial energy users in a system with diverse sources and feedstock (European Commission, 2022).

The effective use of these digital technologies relies on connectivity. Without it, none of the claims explored in literature can come to fruition.

The emissions intensity of digital connectivity

We have moderate confidence in the evidence that the lowest emissions form of digital connectivity is currently fibre.

One study has found that fibre is the most energy efficient technology for broadband access networks, compared with the family of Direct Subscriber Line (DSL) technologies delivering network access through voice lines and Data Over Cable Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) which delivers network access through cable television (European Commission, 2020). Studies brought together by Europacable also demonstrated that fibre is the most energy efficient technology for internet access compared to microwave, millimetre wave, copper, satellite, and laser (Europacable, 2022). This is because there are fewer intermediate devices and amplifiers, and glass fibre is largely passive and requires little energy to function.

Although 5G networks are touted to be more energy efficient than 4G networks, the overall energy and emissions impacts are still uncertain. 5G antennas use three times as much energy as a 4G antennae, and a higher network density will be required (International Energy Agency, 2023). Literature on the energy use of 5G is found to be dominated by small-scale, single technology assessments. Embedded energy use and indirect energy use effects are largely overlooked (Williams, et al., 2022).

Satellite broadband is a less disruptive approach to connect rural areas to the internet, requiring less work on land to lay cables, however the GHG emissions of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites are only recently being explored. An October 2023 study estimates worst-case emissions to be 31-91 times higher than equivalent terrestrial mobile broadband (Osoro, et al., 2023). It is unclear whether the terrestrial mobile broadband used in this comparison is sufficiently representative of a rural broadband connection or fixed broadband.

The World Bank identified a strong statistical connection between the capacity of the network (the number of users and the amount of data they require) and the level of GHG emissions (World Bank, 2022). Fibre has a high data capacity, but is only one component of a network. There are other critical parts of the network infrastructure such as data centres which drive this trend.

The most efficient data centres and emissions reduction

We have moderate confidence in the evidence that hyperscale and co-located data centres are the most efficient and offer a high potential for reducing emissions.

Data centres and data transmission networks account for approximately 1-1.5% of global electricity use, making them responsible for 1% of energy-related GHG emissions (IEA, 2023). Rapid growth in demand at large data centres has resulted in a substantial increase in energy use in this sector, growing 20-40% annually over the past several years (IEA, 2023). As a result of this, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has given data centres the “More Efforts Needed” rating, which means that data centres need to do more to align to the IEA’s Net zero by 2050 Scenario. Progress is assessed at the global level against the IEA’s net zero by 2050 Scenario Trajectory for 2030 (IEA, n.d.), and recommendations are provided on how they can get “on track” with this pathway. Recent trends on reducing the environmental impacts of data centres have generally been in the right direction to match this trajectory; however, without acceleration it will fall short (IEA, n.d.).

The carbon footprint of a data centre is affected by three factors:

• electricity consumption
• water consumption
• lifetime of the equipment.

When analysing these factors, it can be seen in Table 1 that hyperscale and co-located data centres are far more efficient (including accounting for water consumption) than internal data centres. This is driven by better energy utilisation, more efficient cooling systems and increased workloads per server (Lavi, 2022). As a result, they are less carbon intensive per tonne of GHG emissions per workload than internal data centres.

Table 1 – Impacts of hyperscale, colocation and internal data centres. Adapted from Lavi, 2022.

With Scotland’s electricity maintaining a grid intensity of below 50 grams of CO2e per kilowatt hour delivered across 2017-2020 (Scottish Government, 2023), as opposed to the UK average of 149 grams of CO2e per kilowatt hour delivered in 2023 (National Grid, 2023), the emissions intensity of datacentres in Scotland is likely to be significantly lower.

Summary

Investment in digital connectivity can support emission reductions for those primarily industrial sectors which benefit from efficiency. ICT reliant on digital connectivity is supposed to help meet challenges of emission reduction although there is a lack of evidence for these claims.

Digital technology is a source of emissions in and of itself which tends to be overlooked.

As a result of these, we cannot say for certain whether the indirect effects of digitalisation (e.g., saved emissions from home working, see Section 5.1.3) will reduce overall emissions.

Climate adaptation, just transition and investment in digital connectivity

This section sets out the evidence we have been able to find that meets our criteria. Although just transition and adaptation are important policy areas, the steering group wished to focus primarily on Net zero targets and emissions reduction with this research. The Steering Group also emphasised the need to only include information and projects that were current and operating, not theoretical.

The resulting research has emphasised how these concepts are new and emerging. As novel as the concepts such as just transition and adaptation are, the evidence base is being created. As the situation progresses, more and more evidence will be developed to revise the assertions below.

Digital connectivity and adaptation strategies

With the evidence we have been able to find that meets our criteria, we have low confidence in the evidence that digital technologies, which rely on connectivity, support climate adaptation strategies.

ICT technology is an integral component of many proposed mitigation measures (Dwivedi, et al., 2022), but less so for adaptation. Mitigation is reducing and stabilising levels of GHG emissions; adaptation is adapting to life in a changing climate. It is considered by many that digital connectivity and the ability to communicate and share data will be important for adaptation, especially in rural communities.

The example we have been able to find include the European Commission Farmers Measure Water project, where one farmer described how decisions need to be made quickly: “We need fast internet in rural areas because a lot of farmers and water authorities have to make decisions on an hourly basis. If we take a measurement and only see the results in a week’s time, it is too late: the problem has already occurred. If you have fast internet, you have direct access to your data and can decide on the spot what to do” (European Commission, 2022).

Digital technologies can also support climate-resilient agriculture by helping farmers assess weather forecasts and mitigate impacts on crop yields and productivity (United Nations Development Programme, 2023).

In terms of what the ICT sector itself is doing to adapt to climate change, in 2018 TechUK submitted a report to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) on behalf of the ICT sector outlining how the sector intends to adapt to climate change. Within it, they state that ICT infrastructure including connectivity has unique characteristics that make it more resilient (TechUK, 2018). These include:

• Asset life is relatively short. So more resilient assets can be deployed as part of the normal replacement cycle.
• There is built in redundancy in ICT infrastructures so that if same proportion of ICT assets is damaged or affected by climatic events, there are backups.
• Technology development is fast particularly around threats.

The first two of these are in direct conflict with reducing the direct GHG emissions of ICT and digital connectivity delivery. Programmes that mandate less redundancy or longer asset life may affect the ICT industry’s ability to adapt to climate change. The final point reinforces the ICT sector’s claim that it will innovate out of problems, without evidence to support it.

Digital connectivity and a just transition

With the evidence we have been able to find that meets our criteria, there is moderate evidence that digital connectivity supports a just transition.

There is debate in the literature over whether digital connectivity supports a just transition. Views are largely that it may help when accompanied by strong policy. One study shows that the Just Transition Score may increase as digitalisation increases (Wang, et al., 2022), but this could be a correlation rather than indicating causation. The mechanisms are also little explored: for example, one paper sets out that the digital economy indirectly improves just transition by increasing the level of human capital and financial development (Wang, et al., 2022). There is no further investigation into how this takes place.

There are a few points of information related to how digital connectivity relates to just transition:

• People with low and medium income are more vulnerable to the impacts and costs of economic transitions. Transitions may include job automation, increasing need for access to digital solutions and digital public services, higher energy and food prices, or transport poverty (European Commission, 2022).
• Some articles link which digital solutions can be justice and equity enablers. Examples include
• smart energy management and decentralised and distributed energy production and sale (United Nations Development Programme, 2023)
• an easy-to-use and reliable public transport system that improves mobility for all (United Nations Development Programme, 2023).

This indicates that digitalisation may enhance a just transition.

• Collecting data and use of data is highlighted as important for justice and social good (Friends of Europe, 2021). Many smart solutions require a level of monitoring to maintain the efficiency of the service. Regulation, oversight and controls on appropriate data collection and use will be key. This indicates that policy implemented through digital solutions may become increasingly important in relation to a just transition.
• Across many policies, a just transition is also linked to skills development, with the Climate Change Committee (2023) stating digital skills as a fundamental enabler of net zero. The Welsh Government state the need to “prevent existing labour market inequalities being carried through into the new net zero and digital economies” (Welsh Government, 2022), recognising that employers are actively seeking employees with digital skills.

Summary

The evidence base related to digital connectivity and adaptation in relation to concrete real-world examples is very limited among the literature we have reviewed.

There is no direct evidence to date that investment in digital connectivity supports a just transition, but there are many suggestions for mechanisms by which it might influence a just transition. One of these mechanisms is skills development.

Key mechanisms by which digital connectivity influences emissions reduction

Digital connectivity, primary needs for travel and GHG emissions

We have moderate confidence in the evidence that digital connectivity can reduce primary needs for travel, although we have low confidence to whether this reduces GHG emissions in total.

The assumption that digital can replace physical goods or services completely and therefore avert emissions underpins a great deal of policies supporting digitalisation. It is true digitalisation can substitute certain products or GHG generating activities, such as an e-reader capable of displaying hundreds of books or videoconferencing and telework replacing physical travel. Methodologies to measure the true GHG emissions savings of these substitutes are not rigorous or consistent (Hook, et al., 2020). At the same time, demand for travel is still growing (Itten, et al., 2020; Statista, 2023).

Differences in methodology, scope and assumptions make it difficult to estimate average energy savings of working from home versus working in the office. Rebound effects and home energy use is often overlooked, and where they are included, studies find smaller savings (Harvard Business Review, 2022). Rebound effects include increased non-work travel and more short trips. For example, Harvard Business Review found that a decrease in vehicle miles driven is accompanied by a 26% increase in the number of trips taken (Harvard Business Review, 2022). Trips which would have been taken anyway, such as taking children to school, are also not included.

In the report “Emissions impact of home working in Scotland” concludes that working from home leads to a reduction in commuting and office emissions and an increase in home emissions. How these changes in emission balance out for each individual defines whether their net impact from home working will be positive or negative. The authors state that across their scenarios, the overall impact on emissions will be small (Riley, et al., 2021).

Due to the ambiguities in methodologies, the actual or potential GHG emission reductions of teleworking remain uncertain. Economy-wide savings are likely to be modest (Riley, et al., 2021), and in many circumstances could be negative or non-existent (Hook, et al., 2020).

Public sector digital technology use

We have good confidence in the evidence that the public sector is using technology to solve problems linked to sustainability – but the evidence is not accompanied by reports on the effects of technology use on GHG emissions.

The mechanism of reducing GHG emissions by public sector authorities using digital technology is mainly around energy efficiency. Many documents include a wealth of examples of cities using technology to save energy (European Commission, 2022) – but the GHG emissions associated with implementation or life cycle of this equipment have not been considered.

Main source of emissions from digital connectivity and associated ICT

We have good confidence in the evidence that the largest proportion of emissions from digital connectivity and associated ICT equipment comes from waste management after use.

The ICT sector tends to focus on energy use of their products as the largest influence on the carbon footprint. Therefore, there are calls for energy sources to be decarbonised (Ericsson, n.d.). Independent academic studies are more likely to conclude that the carbon footprint or life cycle emissions of a digital product is dominated by electronic waste or e-waste (Itten, et al., 2020 and Dwivedi, et al., 2022). Figure 5 shows the result of a study into video streaming from device purchase, which identifies that 78% of the GHG emissions are from e-waste (Itten, et al., 2020). This illustrates our claim that the largest proportion of emissions from the use of devices comes from waste management after use (please note, extraction of materials and production was not included in this study, which focused on impacts from consumer behaviour).

Figure 5 – Proportion of GHG emissions from the use case of streaming videos (Itten, et al., 2020).

In its 2020 report on e-waste, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) estimates that 15 million tonnes of CO₂e were averted by the recovery of iron, aluminium, and copper from processed e-waste (International Telecommunications Union, 2020). The ITU report also disclosed that less than 18% of all e-waste can be accounted for, meaning that almost 83% of e-waste is likely not properly disposed of. The sector’s emission reductions may be limited because of the uncertain fate of e-waste.

Human behaviour and digital connectivity

We have good confidence in the evidence that human behaviour plays a role in digital trends, rebound effects, and responsible use of digital connectivity.

Academic papers point out that whilst digital technologies are becoming more efficient individually, the higher demand for computing power, storage capacities, transmitted data and devices per person is systematically compensating for this progress (Aebischer & Hilty, 2015) (Hischier & Wager, 2014). This trend can be partially explained by rebound effects regarding time, volume, weight, and price (Itten, et al., 2020), but also human behaviour. Technology can act as a fashion or wealth statement, with the average person owning more and more connected devices such as smartphones and smart watches. These are often replaced with the latest model far sooner than is required on a technology replacement cycle (Itten, et al., 2020).

Future ICT sector energy consumption reduction

We have moderate confidence in assertions that the ICT sector will continue to innovate to reduce energy consumption.

Deployment of next generation low-power chips and more efficient connectivity technologies (5G and 6G, networks powered by artificial intelligence) is repeatably hailed as the way to reduce the overall footprint of ICT (European Commission, 2022).

Each switch to new standards or technologies requires a massive replacement of equipment. For example, 5G and 6G will require users to replace equipment, due to lack of backwards compatibility of existing smartphones, tablets, and computers. Also, as a growing fraction of products become smart or part of the Internet of Things (IoT), overall resource demand could decrease in theory. In practice, the opposite happens because software-controlled objects are also prone to software-induced obsolescence (Kern et al., 2018; NGI, 2020). While each new model is likely to be more energy efficient than the last, and while smaller smart IoT devices may not consume large amounts of energy in use, 85-95% of their lifecycle energy footprint is created in production. The sheer number and variety make them particularly susceptible to obsolescence once software or hardware support runs out (NGI, 2020).

The fast-evolving nature of digital technologies and the possible sharp increase in digitally enabled services is likely to reinforce the ICT sector’s growing emissions (European Commission, 2023). The European Commission has set out that unless digital technologies are made more energy-efficient, their widespread use will increase energy consumption.

Summary

The key mechanisms that ICT and digitalisation can reduce GHG emissions described by literature include replacing the need to travel, although there is evidence that these savings may not be as high as first thought. The largest source of emissions from ICT equipment is after use, as e-waste, something that changing standards and upgrading systems can increase. Human behaviour plays a role in the resulting emissions from ICT and digitalisation.

Key examples of digital connectivity policies

We studied international policies associated with digital connectivity and decarbonisation, adaptation and just transition in 10 countries, selected based on the methodology in Section 4, to gather important contextual information for Scotland. The degree to which each country links their digital goals and strategy has been given a score, with five representing explicit mention of the GHG or carbon impacts of increased digitalisation, and one representing no mention or linking of decarbonisation within the policy, see Appendix 1 for further detail on the scoring.

Appendix 2: Summary of digital policies across 10 countries provides further detail on individual policies.

Decarbonisation impact of these policies

Policy measures to support emission reductions, adaptation or just transition

Few of the countries we studied for this research have set policy measures designed to support emission reductions, adaptation, or just transition in direct association with digital technologies.

No evidence of impact has been identified during this review. This does not prove a lack of progress or attention. There are other jurisdictions outside the scope of this research which may have evidence of policy impact. An example is the European Union Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles. This promotes digital products and services with a minimum negative impact on the environment and on society, as well as digital technologies that help fight climate change (European Commission, n.d.).

Sustainability considerations of using ICT and digital infrastructure

We have good confidence that European countries are starting to look at the sustainability considerations of using ICT and digital infrastructure.

The European Commission is leading the way in setting net zero or climate neutrality targets for certain elements of ICT infrastructure. In the “Fit for the Digital Age Strategy”, the Commission sets ambitious goals such as the climate neutrality of data centres in the EU by 2030 (European Commission, 2023). Measures to improve the circularity of digital devices and to reduce electronic waste include the Right to Repair Directive (European Commission, 2023) and the recently issued eco-design criteria for mobile phones and tablets (European Commission, 2023). These should have a corresponding positive impact on lifecycle emissions from digital technologies. Efforts are also ongoing to develop low-energy chips under the European Processor Initiative (European Processor Initiative, 2023).

The European Commission is starting to look at policy and governance around ICT direct and indirect emissions: “Until recently, the digital transition progressed with only limited sustainability considerations. To diminish adverse side effects and deliver its full potential for enabling environmental, social, and economic sustainability, the digital transition requires appropriate policy framing and governance” (European Commission, 2022).

“Digitalisation is an excellent lever to accelerate the transition towards a climate-neutral, circular, and more resilient economy. At the same time, we must put the appropriate policy framework in place to avoid adverse effects of digitalisation on the environment.” Svenja Schulze, Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety of Germany (European Council, 2020).

Policy development programmes for datacentre best practice

We have good confidence that countries are starting to drive policy for data centre best practice.

In Estonia, the government has moved to the use of the Estonian Government Cloud (Riigipilv) for ‘Infrastructure, Platform and Software as a Service.’ Analysis of this pointed out that eliminating in-house servers and server rooms, instead relying on cloud services via data centres, offers the biggest potential for reducing emissions (Vihma, 2022). Data centres of the Estonian Government also use the ISO50001 energy management certification.

In Germany^[3], the Government launched the Green IT initiative in 2008 to reduce the energy consumption and GHG emissions of its ICT operations. One objective set for the 2022 to 2027 phase of Green IT initiative includes that ‘main’ data centres (>100kW ICT load) owned by the government should meet the German Federal Government Blue Angel criteria for energy efficient data centres (Blume & Keith, 2023). From the start of the initiative, energy consumption has fallen by 49% from 649.65 GWh in 2008 to 334.54 GWh in 2021. This reduced consumption resulted in budgetary savings of €546 million (Blume & Keith, 2023).

In Denmark, the Agency for Digital Government examined which environmental requirements the public sector can include in tenders for data centres and concluded that the EU’s Green Public Procurement criteria is the most appropriate to use (Agency for Digital Government, n.d.).

In China, the Government has called for an average Power Usage Effectiveness of 1.25 in the east and 1.2 in the west of the country as part of its Eastern Data and Western Computing Project. Major cities now have maximum Power Usage Effectiveness requirements for new data centres, including Beijing (1.4), Shanghai (1.3) and Shenzhen (1.4) (IEA, 2023). Power Usage Effectiveness is the metric used to determine the energy efficiency of a data centre.

The private sector is also taking action to reduce the environmental impacts. In January 2021, date centre operators and industry association in Europe launched the Climate Neutral Data Centre Pact, pledging to make data centres climate-neutral by 2030 with intermediate (2025) targets for PUE and carbon-free energy (IEA, 2023).

Baseline assessments and monitoring

We have good confidence that there is no current framework for baseline assessment or monitoring of the environmental impact of increased digitalisation which also considers the indirect benefits and potential rebound effects.

There is a need to develop consistent metrics to measure the impact of technology on the environment (United Nations Environment Programme, 2021).

The European Commission identifies a need for a science-based assessment methodology on the ‘net environmental impact’ of increased digitalisation that consider both the benefits and the possible rebound effects (European Commission, 2022). The Commission has therefore launched dedicated research and innovation initiatives, saying that it will launch a project under Horizon Europe, to develop a methodology and common indicators for measuring the footprint of ICT (European Commission, 2023). In the UK, Building Digital UK also recognises this as a gap and will be reporting on environmental benefits of their interventions (Building Digital UK, 2023). Similarly, EU Member States are collaborating on the Toulouse call for a Green and Digital Transition in the EU. This looks to monitor the impact of digitalisation on the environment and contribute to the development of measurement tools (Presidence Francaise, 2022).

While the framework does not exist to quantify the full scope of direct and indirect effects, a number of standards exist for some elements.

Global standards to support carbon accounting in the ICT sector

There are global standards that can support carbon accounting (the method used to calculate a carbon footprint) in the ICT sector.

The main ones recognised and accepted by ICT bodies are:

• Greenhouse Gas Protocol ICT Sector Guidance. This builds on the internationally accepted GHG Protocol Product Life Cycle Accounting and Reporting Standard (GeSI and Carbon Trust, 2017).
• Recommendation ITU-T L.1470 (01/2020) (International Telecommunications Union, 2020).
• “Guidance for ICT companies setting science-based targets.” (Science Based Targets Initiative, 2022).

In summary

Our literature review has found no good examples of international experience of applying standard carbon accounting in the ICT sector, and this gap is recognised at the European Union level. Standards exist at the corporate or product level which could be adapted.

Conclusions

This work is the start of a process. As a rapid review, we were able to quickly identify information which fit our criteria, but there may be areas we have missed. Digital connectivity infrastructure and ICT are highly interconnected and overlapping with our behaviours and geography, and so this exercise has also highlighted we are having to pull together disparate pieces of information, research and case studies to try to come to conclusions. A key challenge is in understanding the “net” picture – there are disparate sources citing the means by which digital connectivity can impact on emissions, but it is not possible to combine this evidence to form a complete picture.

We were asked to research five key questions and found the following answers:

• To what extent is there evidence that investment in digital connectivity can support emissions reduction, climate adaptation and a just transition?

We have found mixed evidence of the decarbonisation impact, adaptation and just transition of digital connectivity. The sector produces direct emissions from energy consumption and generation of e-waste. This is despite the possibility that it can reduce indirect emissions through increasing efficiency and behaviour changes such as reduced travel linked to working from home. Studies point out a need for a holistic approach in calculating GHG emissions of the ICT sector, including rebound effects and emissions from the end-of-life. This would ensure indirect emissions and emissions from end-of-life are fully accounted for.

Investment in digital connectivity can support emissions reduction for those primarily industrial sectors that benefit most from efficiency. ICT technology and digitalisation can and does reduce GHG emissions in other industries. Heavy industry and the energy sector would benefit the most from digitalisation. ICT reliant on connectivity is supposed to help meet challenges of emissions reduction although there is a lack of evidence for these claims.

The ICT sector is a source of GHG emissions, which tends to be overlooked. It is our view that the reduction in indirect GHG emissions (largely driven by digitalising and making other sectors more efficient) does not negate the need to reduce the ICT sector’s direct impacts from energy consumption and generation of e-waste.

While the ICT sector focuses on the emissions associated with energy use, which is not insignificant, we have good confidence that the GHG emissions associated with e-waste are of growing concern internationally in terms of reaching climate goals. It is uncertain whether ICT’s GHG emissions reduction potential in other sectors can actually outweigh its direct emissions. It gives us only moderate confidence that the ICT sector can help reduce more emissions than are inherent in the manufacture, use and disposal of the equipment used to achieve those savings.

There is a great deal of speculation that digital technologies have the potential to aid adaptation to climate challenges, especially in rural areas, though with few concrete examples. While there is no direct evidence that investment in digital connectivity supports a just transition, there are many suggestions for mechanisms by which it might influence a just transition. One of these mechanisms is skills development, which is also recognised as a key enabler for net zero. Digital connectivity and ICT are capable of doing both good and bad, either addressing or exacerbating existing inequalities, as well as questions around access to connectivity and skills. Studies repeat the need for strong policy in this area.

• If so, what are the key mechanisms by which this could occur (for example, reduction in travel, investment in green data centres or other mechanisms suggested in the evidence)?

The key mechanisms by which ICT and digitalisation can reduce GHG emissions, as described by literature, include replacing the need to travel, although there is evidence that these savings may not be as high as first thought. The largest source of emissions from ICT equipment is e-waste, which changing standards and upgrading systems can increase. Human behaviour plays a role, either positive or negative, in the emissions from ICT and digitalisation.

• What are key examples of existing policies (in Scotland, such as in local authorities, the UK and/or international examples from comparable countries) designed to support emission reductions, adaptation and/ or just transition through digital connectivity? Is there any evidence for the impact of such policies?

No evidence of impact has been identified during this review. Many of the countries analogous to Scotland have policy that mentioned digitalisation as an enabler or essential piece of their decarbonisation, climate change or net zero agenda. None of them were accompanied by evidence of impact of their policies. This does not prove a lack of progress or attention. There are other countries outside the scope of this research that may have evidence of policy impact.

• What are the different options suggested within the literature for Scotland to provide a baseline assessment of, and monitor carbon emissions from digital infrastructure, technologies, and associated activities?

There are no good examples of what other countries are doing, and this gap is recognised at the European Union level. Standards exist at the corporate or product level, which could be adapted.

• What are the other key gaps in existing knowledge where further research is required to support digital connectivity and Scotland’s climate change goals?

Gaps include a need for a baseline assessment methodology, direct studies exploring the questions asked in this research and a consistent methodology for calculating direct and indirect emissions from ICT and digitalisation.

Gaps identified by this research

We have used specific search criteria and search words and applied them in google and google scholar. On basis of this search, we have found the following evidence gaps:

• There is no active study that has been found within this review that investigates whether investment in digital connectivity directly results in GHG emissions reduction.

There are varying approaches to quantifying direct and indirect emissions of ICT, with no academic or sector wide consensus.

There are different approaches and methodologies for calculating and comparing the GHG emissions of digital and non-digital practices and solutions, for example online versus in-person events. As an example, (Hook, et al., 2020) outlines that working from home evaluations should encompass the following:

• energy footprint
• transportation footprint
• technology footprint
• waste footprint.

The evidence we have found to investigate whether digital connectivity contributes to a just transition and the key mechanisms by which this occurs is not conclusive or good quality.

The ICT sector and literature focus on emissions reduction, with climate adaptation either an afterthought or future looking, with few real-world examples.

Case studies of digital technologies saving money, power or water in municipalities focus on the GHG emissions reduced or averted, with no acknowledgment of rebound effects, which literature states is important.

The GHG emissions associated with the collection and use of data, which is deemed to be necessary to digitalisation, are opaque and limited to specific studies on data centres. For example, the full lifecycle of the Internet of Things is not explored in the literature.

Lack of evidence of policy to address GHG emissions of e-waste e.g. from refrigerants leaking GHG.

Lack of evidence of policy to address the embedded GHG emissions from extraction of raw materials and production of the ICT equipment.

Lack of best practice for measuring, monitoring and assessing the GHG footprint of electronic communications services. The European Commission is also looking to develop this in a Horizon Europe project.

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Appendix 1: Detailed methodology and approach to the research

This Annex details the methodologies developed and used to complete this research project.

Definitions

The scope of this project defines ‘climate change’ as including Scotland’s interim and 2045 Net zero and emissions reduction targets. Although just transition and adaptation are important policy areas, the steering group wished to focus primarily on Net zero targets and emissions reduction with this research. The Steering Group also emphasised the need to only include information and projects that were current and operating, not theoretical.

By ‘digital connectivity’, we include the following:

Infrastructure

• fixed broadband (including subsea fibre, trunk or backhaul fibre, and access fibre)
• mobile connectivity (including 4G and 5G macro and 5G small cells)
• Datacentres Application, use and behaviours.
• existing applications such as artificial intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things (IoT)
• data-driven products and services
• practices such as working from home that are enabled by digital connectivity.

Geographical scope

• in Scotland and/or serves Scotland
• where there is applicable learning for Scotland.

Key dependencies

• digital skills
• renewable energy

These are all encompassed in our Figure 1 – The landscape of digital connectivity defined as within scope of this research. on page 14 of this report.

Literature review

Search terms

The search terms we used were agreed by the Steering Group on 24^th October 2023, these are set out below under the subheadings of Infrastructure, Application, use and behaviour, Geographical scope, and Key dependencies. We used Google and Google Scholar search engines.

Infrastructure:

• Digital connectivity infrastructure strategy
• Digital connectivity infrastructure policy
• Digital connectivity and climate change
• Digital transformation
• Broadband strategy
• Broadband policy
• Mobile network strategy
• Mobile network policy
• 5G strategy
• 5G policy
• Remote digital connectivity
• Rural digital connectivity
• Digital connectivity national plan
• Digital connectivity policy
• Economy strategy + datacentres (looking for links to environmental topics)
• Datacentres as opportunities for economic growth (looking for links to environmental topics)
• National Data Strategy (looking for links to environmental topics)
• Security of data infrastructure (looking for links to environmental topics)
• Resilience of data infrastructure (looking for links to environmental topics)
• Net zero digital connectivity infrastructure
• Net zero broadband infrastructure
• Net zero mobile network infrastructure
• Net zero datacentres
• Green digital connectivity infrastructure
• Green broadband infrastructure
• Green mobile network infrastructure
• Green datacentres
• ‘distribution’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’ or ‘just transition’ of digital connectivity infrastructure
• ‘distribution’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’ or ‘just transition’ of broadband infrastructure
• ‘distribution’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’ or ‘just transition’ of mobile network infrastructure
• ‘distribution’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’ or ‘just transition’ of datacentres
• Environmental impacts of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Environmental impacts of broadband infrastructure
• Environmental impacts of mobile network infrastructure
• Environmental impacts of datacentres
• Environmental footprint of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Environmental footprint of digital networks
• Sustainable digital infrastructure
• Sustainable broadband
• Digital carbon footprint
• Carbon emissions of datacentres
• Carbon emissions of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Carbon emissions of home working
• Environmental payback of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Environmental payback of broadband infrastructure
• Environmental payback of mobile network infrastructure
• Environmental payback of datacentres
• Life cycle assessment of working from home.
• Defra carbon factors for working from home.
• Life cycle assessment of broadband
• Life cycle assessment of mobile phones / mobile network infrastructure
• Life cycle assessment of datacentres
• Energy intensity of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Energy intensity of broadband infrastructure
• Energy intensity of mobile network infrastructure
• Energy intensity of datacentres
• Environmental sustainability of digital connectivity infrastructure
• Environmental sustainability of broadband infrastructure
• Environmental sustainability of mobile phones / mobile network infrastructure
• Environmental sustainability of datacentres.

Application, use and behaviours

• AI strategy
• Internet of Things (usually in the digital strategy and linked to Environmental departments of councils, waste etc).
• Working from home strategies across business groups and government.

Geographical Scope:

• The analysis of policies was focused on:
• Scotland
• Finland,
• Wales,
• Portugal,
• Norway,
• Sweden,
• Estonia,
• Canada (Ontario),
• New Zealand,
• Denmark and
• Iceland

These jurisdictions have topological and population density scale comparisons with Scotland and are likely to face similar digital connectivity issues (land mass, areas of low population density, rural communities).

Some further findings on China were identified as part of the research and included in the report.

Key dependencies

Key dependencies were discussed as part of the scoping analysis as follows:

• Digital skills strategies – from school age to beyond in target countries
• Government skills strategies
• Government “digital transformation” strategies – usually local government
• Digital inclusion strategies
• Renewable energy strategy (to see if there’s a link to digital)
• National Grid and Distribution Network Operators / Distribution System Operator and their requirements for digital connectivity (fixed and mobile)

Methodology for policy review

We undertook a desk review of existing policies from countries within our scope. We looked for whether their policies were designed to support emission reductions, adaptation or just transition through digital connectivity. Section 7 presents our results and uses a score to rate the extent that digital connectivity and emissions reduction is linked within a country’s policy, with five being explicit mention of the GHG or carbon impacts of increased digitalisation and one being no mention or linking of decarbonisation within the policy.

Table 3 – Key of star ratings used to assess country policies and their link between digital connectivity and emissions reduction.

Assessment of confidence

Following a methodology developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for the fifth assessment report and used for the sixth for the consistent treatment of uncertainties, we developed a confidence level based on the extent of agreement in the literature and the robustness of evidence. Figure 3 on page 15 sets out what constitutes low, moderate, and good confidence in our claims.

• Low agreement is where sources conflict.
• Medium agreement is where sources make broadly similar conclusions but the data or evidence they use to support their conclusions is very different.
• High agreement is where sources independently make similar conclusions and underlying data are similar despite being independent.
• Limited evidence is some evidence available but largely anecdotal and not from recognised peer reviewed sources. Availability of data was low.
• Medium evidence is information from peer reviewed sources or official sources.
• Robust evidence is a greater volume of information from peer reviewed sources and official sources.

Appendix 2: Summary of digital policies across 10 countries.

A summary of digital policies and their links with decarbonisation, across 10 countries selected based on the methodology in Section 4. The degree to which each country links their digital goals and strategy has been given a score, with five representing explicit mention of the GHG or carbon impacts of increased digitalisation, and one representing no mention or linking of decarbonisation within the policy.

The policies from the individual countries are presented in Appendix 2: Summary of digital policies across 10 countries.

Some policies explicitly mentioned a just transition, and reference to adaptation was not found in any of the policies we were able to identify. See Section 7.2.3 for specific comment on data centre related policy.

Finland

Score: five – digitalisation and decarbonisation linked heavily, and mentions of wider collaboration with other decarbonisation initiatives as well as of the GHG or carbon impacts of increased digitalisation.

Finnish policy does connect increased digitalisation with helping the green transition, but there is no explicit mention of the carbon impact of increased digitalisation on the environment.

The Finnish Government: Digital Compass was drawn up for the purpose of managing the development of the digital transformation in Finland. Based on European values and the Digital Decade 2030 programme. Promotes an economically, socially and ecologically sustainable digital green transition (Finnish Government, 2022).

Objective 9 of the Digital Compass states that Finland develops and applies digital technologies that respond to global climate and environmental challenges (European Union Digital Skills and Jobs Platform, 2023).

Ministry of Finance Finland: Sustainable Growth Programme for Finland aims to support growth that is ecologically, socially and economically sustainable in line with the aims of the Govt Programme. Funding will come mainly from EU Recovery Plan ‘Next Generation EU’ – one of four key elements ‘Digitalisation and a digital economy will strengthen productivity and make services available to all’ (Ministry of Finance Finland, n.d.)

Portugal

Score: two – minor mention of decarbonisation in the digital connectivity policy.

Portugal says digitalisation will contribute to decarbonisation.

Portugal’s Action Plan for Digital Transition (Measure 9) speaks to increased digitalisation of public services, which it reports will contribute to decarbonisation and environmental benefits. (Portugal Digital, 2020)

Portuguese Secretary of State for the Digital Transition has partnered with Digital With Purpose (2020 onwards) to acknowledge and deliver digital sustainability. (Global Enabling Sustainability Initiative, 2020)

Norway

Score: two – minor mention of decarbonisation in the digital connectivity policy.

Norwegian policy connects increased digitalisation with aiding the green transition.

The Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Digitalisation for Development, Digital Strategy for Norwegian Digital Policy acknowledges climate change as an important priority but doesn’t directly acknowledge the climate impacts of ICT (Norwegian Minstry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

The Norway-EU Green Alliance acknowledges that digital transition is important for and contributes to the green transition (Norway and European Union, n.d.).

Sweden

Score: four – digitalisation and decarbonisation linked heavily, and mentions of wider collaboration with other decarbonisation initiatives.

Swedish policy links the use of ICT to decarbonisation effects, as well as acknowledging decarbonisation, circularity, conscious choices, and the energy transition as drivers for a sustainable world.

The Swedish Government’s ICT for a Greener Administration report outlined the importance of acquisition and public procurement, use of ICT in government agencies and digital tools to reduce business travel (OECD, 2018).

The focus of the Swedish Information Society policy is, among other things, to use ICT to promote sustainable growth (Regeringskansliet, 2010).

Estonia

Score: five – digitalisation and decarbonisation linked heavily, and mentions of wider collaboration with other decarbonisation initiatives as well as of the GHG or carbon impacts of increased digitalisation.

Estonian policy contains a clear and explicit mention of the carbon effects of increased digital footprints, and provides a commitment to reduce the effects.

The Estonian Digital Agenda 2030 stresses the activities of the Estonian development plan contribute through the use of innovative technologies and environmentally friendly solutions to reduce the impact of climate change. They are also meant to reduce the time required for covering distances and ensure a good living environment all across Estonia.

The Estonian government also has Green Digital Government Commitments, stating “we analyse the environmental impact of the Estonian digital government and ways to reduce it” (European Union Digital Skills and Jobs Platform, 2023).

Canada (Ontario)

Score: one – no mention of decarbonisation within digital connectivity policy.

Canadian policy contains no mention of the carbon or environmental impact of increased digitalisation.

Canada’s Digital Ambition 2022 mentions at a high level that their Digital Ambition aligns with the Greening Government Strategy – but delivery on specific plans is unclear from published policy and strategy (Government of Canada, 2022).

The Building a Digital Ontario – Ontario’s Digital Strategy does not mention environmental protection or any digital sector emissions (Ontario, n.d.).

The Ontario Onwards Action plan mentions the importance of environmental protection, but does not specifically link environmental protection with digital and sustainability.

“The Government of Canada’s Digital Ambition goes hand in hand with the Greening Government Strategy, which seeks to make Government of Canada’s operations low carbon through green procurement and clean technologies. Through the increased promotion of environmental sustainability, and by integrating environmental considerations in its procurement process, the federal government is in a position to influence the demand for environmentally preferable goods and services” (Ontario, 2020).

New Zealand

Score: one – no mention of decarbonisation within digital connectivity policy.

New Zealand policy does not explicitly mention the carbon or environmental impacts of increased digitalisation.

The Digital Strategy for Aotearoa proclaims: “we use data and digital technology to address big issues of our time like climate change. We also want the tech sector to play a key role in creating a more equitable, low-carbon future.” (Digital.Govt.NZ, n.d.)

However sustainable delivery or green ICT is not noted in any of the flagship initiatives of the Action Plan for the Digital Strategy for Aotearoa (Digital.Govt.NZ, 2022).

Denmark

Score: four – digitalisation and decarbonisation linked heavily, and mentions of wider collaboration with other decarbonisation initiatives.

Danish policy takes a holistic approach to digitalisation and digital section emissions, with direct considerations for green ICT acquisition and support for the EU’s Green Public Procurement criteria.

The Danish Ministry of Finance’s National Strategy for Digitalization focuses on digital as an enabler and doesn’t consider the impact of digital emissions (The Danish Government, 2022).

The “Visions and Recommendations for Denmark as a Digital Pioneer” document focusses on digitising energy and utility data as a prerequisite to understand the impact of increased digital connectivity. Heavier focus on using digital to achieve green transition (Digitalserings Partnerskabet, 2021).

The Agency for Digital Government – Digital Green Transition lays out plans for the EU’s Green Public Procurement criteria to have been tested throughout 2022 and 2023 (Agency for Digital Government, n.d.).

The Study on the Digital Green Transition in the Nordic-Baltic Countries does not explicitly mention the quantification of spend vs emissions (Agency for Digital Government, n.d.).

Iceland

Score: three – digitalisation recognised or reported as a contributor to green transition, but no mention of the GHG impacts of digitalisation.

Icelandic policy nods to sustainable procurement as a lever for green digitalisation, but provides no quantification.

The Digital Green Transition – Government of Iceland sets out the Icelandic ambition to leverage digital effects to achieve and accelerate the green transition (Nordic Council of Ministers, n.d.) (Government of Iceland, 2021) (Stjornarrad islands, 2023)

Wales

Score: four – digitalisation and decarbonisation linked heavily, and mentions of wider collaboration with other decarbonisation initiatives.

It is recognised that digitalisation will play a role in the transition to net zero in the Decarbonising Wales with digital technology website.

The policy for Wales also mentions a just transition and how skills are central to that (Centre for Digital Public Services, 2022).

Tech Net Zero discovery investigated greener government and third sector tech report came up with 6 recommendations of how public services could use digital technologies to reach net zero, one of which was to measure the carbon footprint of a digital service (Centre for Digital Public Services, 2022).

© Published by Frazer-Nash Consultancy, 2024 on behalf of ClimateXChange. All rights reserved.

While every effort is made to ensure the information in this report is accurate, no legal responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions or misleading statements. The views expressed represent those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders.

1. 
   

   Double Diamond Model: what is it? – Justinmind ↑

   
   
2. 
   

   Using the supply, use and input-output tables and 2019 data coupled with the Greenhouse Gas Effects 2024-2025 (Scottish Government, 2023) and includes the direct and indirect carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the following sectors: Computers, electronics and opticals; Telecommunications; Computer services; and Information services. ↑

   
   
3. 
   

   Whilst undertaking the research to support this statement we have identified additional information, beyond the scope of our initial research, for Germany and China. ↑

   
   

The purpose of this study was to:

• identify the range of skills needed by the onshore wind industry to increase onshore wind capacity to a minimum of 20 GW by 2030
• inform the enhancement of skills and training provision to meet future sector needs.

Researchers interviewed Scottish onshore wind stakeholders and developed a workforce model.

Findings

• To meet the 2030 ambition, the workforce serving the onshore wind sector will need to increase from around 6,900 FTE (full time equivalent) in 2024 to a peak of around 20,500 FTE in 2027. Over 90% of these roles will be in construction and installation of wind farms. These job opportunities will only be available if estimates regarding the forthcoming onshore wind project pipeline materialise.
• Overall, stakeholders felt that those working in the sector have the right skills, but there are skilled workforce shortages. In the short term, there is a need for more people to join the sector and for individuals from other sectors to be reskilled/ upskilled. Without this, the sector faces challenges in delivering new projects on time, maintaining existing wind farms and maximising economic and environmental benefits.
• Not addressing skill shortages is likely to have a severe impact on the 2030 ambition. By 2027, the model developed in this study predicts that, on average, four times more FTEs will be required for construction and installation than in 2024. Within this, five times more civil contractors will be required. More than 46% of these individuals will be required to build wind farms in Highland and Dumfries and Galloway, regions where stakeholders have highlighted is already difficult to recruit individuals. For operations and maintenance the figures are smaller and the timeframes longer: around 2.5 times as many roles will be required in 2030 than in 2024. The regions with the highest requirement, of around 37%, are again Highland and Dumfries and Galloway.
• There will be significant shortages in technical roles, particularly high voltage engineers and wind turbine technicians. Across Scotland, FTE for electricity grid connections will need to increase from 1,100 in 2024 to 4,500 in 2027, a 400% increase. The number of wind turbine technician FTE will need to increase from around 465 in 2024 to almost 1,200 in 2030, a 258% increase. These will affect project development and operations if they are not resolved.
• The scarcity of skilled planners and specialist environmental consultants is set to continue. An average of 100 FTE planners and 434 FTE environmental consultants is estimated to be required across Scotland each year to enable wind farm developments between 2024 and 2030.
• Digital skills for data analysis and drone inspections need to grow to improve turbine performance monitoring.
• There will be a need for diverse skillsets within the sector, including project management, stakeholder engagement and regulatory compliance.

If you require the report in an alternative format, such as a Word document, please contact info@climatexchange.org.uk or 0131 651 4783.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7488/era/4426

Executive summary

Aims

The purpose of this study is to deliver on a commitment in the Scottish Onshore Wind Sector Deal (SOWSD) to “publish a paper identifying the range of skills needed by industry to deliver our 2030 target” ^[1] and to inform the enhancement of skills and training provision to meet future sector needs.

Approach

We interviewed 22 Scottish onshore wind stakeholders between February and March 2024, including 11 developers, one owner / operator, two construction companies, two consultancies, three operation and maintenance providers, two skills and training providers and one local authority planning department. Furthermore, we developed a workforce model based on:

• the BVG Associates assessment of the pipeline of onshore wind projects in Scotland underlying their 2023 report “Scotland onshore wind pipeline analysis 2023-2030” and
• our estimates of the workforce requirements for a typical onshore wind project based on wider ITPEnergised insights from working on more than 500 onshore wind projects and validated through stakeholder consultation as part of the study.

Modelling assumptions were validated with the stakeholders above in March 2024.

Findings

• To meet the 2030 ambition, the workforce serving the onshore wind sector will need to increase from around 6,900 FTE (full time equivalent) in 2024 to a peak of around 20,500 FTE in 2027. Over 90% of these roles will be in construction and installation of wind farms. Employment by activity is shown in Figure 1. These job opportunities will only be available if estimates regarding the forthcoming onshore wind project pipeline materialise.

Figure 1: Annual FTE per onshore wind project stage.

Source: Workforce model using data from BVG Associates 2023 and consultants’ expertise.

• Overall, stakeholders felt that those working in the sector have the right skills, but there are skilled workforce shortages. In the short term, there is a need for more people to join the sector and for individuals from other sectors to be reskilled/ upskilled. Without this, the sector faces challenges in delivering new projects on time, maintaining existing wind farms and maximising economic and environmental benefits.
• Not addressing skill shortages is likely to have a severe impact on the ambition to install 20 GW of onshore wind by 2030. By 2027, our model predicts that, on average, four times more FTEs will be required for construction and installation than in 2024. Within this, five times more civil contractors will be required. More than 46% of these individuals will be required to build wind farms in Highland and Dumfries and Galloway, regions where stakeholders have highlighted is already difficult to recruit individuals. For operations and maintenance (O&M) the figures are smaller and the timeframes longer: around 2.5 times as many roles will be required in 2030 than in 2024. The regions with the highest requirement, of around 37%, are again Highland and Dumfries and Galloway^[2].
• There will be significant shortages in technical roles, particularly high voltage engineers and wind turbine technicians. Across Scotland, FTE for electricity grid connections will need to increase from 1,100 in 2024 to 4,500 in 2027, a 400% increase. The number of wind turbine technician FTE will need to increase from around 465 in 2024 to almost 1,200 in 2030, a 258% increase. These will affect project development and operations if they are not resolved.
• The scarcity of skilled planners and specialist environmental consultants is set to continue. An average of 100 FTE planners and 434 FTE environmental consultants is estimated to be required across Scotland each year to enable wind farm developments between 2024 and 2030.
• Stakeholders have identified a growth need for digital skills for data analysis and drone inspections to improve turbine performance monitoring.
• There will be a need for diverse skillsets within the sector, which encompass project management, stakeholder engagement and regulatory compliance.

Recommendations

• The Scottish Government, together with partners in other public agencies, industry and the education sector, has the opportunity to address expected skill shortages in relation to the 20 GW capacity ambition by 2030. Investing in skills development is not only essential for the success of individual onshore wind projects but also for Scotland’s broader renewable energy goals. Addressing these shortages will require a comprehensive approach, including workforce development initiatives, training programmes and industry-academy collaborations. In this regard, collaboration between stakeholders from the public, private and education sectors will be crucial to bridge skills divides and unlock the full potential of Scotland’s onshore wind resources.
• Undertake a purposeful awareness raising programme of career opportunities within the sector, the transferrable nature of the skills developed and that many job categories in this sector will be required for a long time.
• Implement targeted campaigns in rural areas where most new installations will take place, to demonstrate highly skilled jobs for local people, many of which pay well above the average UK salary.

Glossary / Abbreviations table

Introduction

Background

Onshore wind is a mature technology, with the first commercial windfarms built in the 1980s in the US and in Denmark. Scotland’s first commercial onshore windfarm, Hagshaw Hill, started generating electricity in 1995. Rapid expansion in the last 30 years has seen onshore wind supplying electricity in countries all over the world. An overview of the recent developments in the global onshore wind industry is provided in Appendix A.

The Scottish Government has recognised the importance of onshore and offshore wind to supply the increased amounts of electricity that will be necessary to achieve net zero carbon emissions by 2045. In the Onshore Wind Policy Statement, the Scottish Government stated its ambition to increase the installed onshore wind capacity of 9 GW in 2021 to a minimum of 20 GW by 2030 (Scottish Government, 2022). Furthermore, the Government intends that this should benefit communities across Scotland and allow a just transition of the workforce to skilled jobs within the onshore wind sector. The statement was followed in 2023 by the Scottish Onshore Wind Sector Deal (SOWSD), which committed to support the delivery of the necessary skills and training across Scotland to contribute to a just transition and realise the 20 GW ambition (Scottish Government, 2023).

Purpose of this study

The purpose of this study is to deliver on a commitment in the SOWSD and in turn, to:

• understand the jobs and skills requirements to support the deployment of onshore wind
• provide the analysis from which the enhancement of current skills and training provisions to meet future sector needs can be developed.

The aim is to map the annual numbers of jobs and skills needed to achieve 20 GW of installed onshore wind capacity by 2030. The specific objectives are to:

• estimate the number and types of jobs required annually in each stage of an onshore wind project
• estimate the geographic spread of these jobs across Scotland
• analyse the current level of skills available for onshore wind and the demand for these skills
• understand whether there are any skills gaps or shortages within the onshore wind industry in Scotland
• understand future demands for skills to enable the 2030 target to be achieved
• identify any skills gaps and make recommendations as to how these might be addressed.

Study methodology

We interviewed 22 Scottish onshore wind stakeholders between February and March 2024. These included 11 developers, one owner / operator, two construction companies, two consultancies, three operation and maintenance providers, two skills and training providers and one local authority planning department. Furthermore, we developed a workforce model that was based on analysis undertaken by BVG Associates of the pipeline of onshore wind projects in Scotland (BVG Associates, 2023), combined with the ITPEnergised assessment of the job requirements for a typical onshore wind project. This provided an assessment of job requirements for each project stage of a wind farm. Workforce numbers, job roles and modelling assumptions were validated in writing with the consulted stakeholders in March 2024.

In the remainder of the document, Section 4 provides an overview of the onshore wind sector in Scotland and a description of the job roles associated with each stage of the project lifecycle. Section 5 presents a summary of the modelling methodology and estimates of current and future job numbers. Section 6 describes the skills associated with the job types identified in Sections 4 and 5 and outlines the findings from our stakeholder engagement regarding skills shortages. Section 7 outlines options for addressing skills shortages from the stakeholder engagement and an international overview. Section 8 provides conclusions and recommendations.

Project pipeline, lifecycle and associated job roles

We reviewed the UK Government’s Renewable Energy Planning database (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2023) to identify the project lifecycle phase of all onshore wind farms in Scotland. At the end of 2023, there was approximately 9.8 GW of installed onshore wind capacity in Scotland. This was distributed across 329 operational sites. The largest of these is at Clyde Wind Farm (operated by SSE Renewables in South Lanarkshire) with an installed capacity of 350 MW, and the smallest is Lower Rumster in Highland with an installed capacity of 0.2 MW. Highland has the largest amount of installed wind capacity (2.12 GW) followed by South Lanarkshire (1.352 GW) and Dumfries & Galloway (1.122 GW). All other local authorities have less than 1 GW installed capacity.

As of September 2023, there were 240 sites either under construction, awaiting construction or with planning applications submitted. These totalled 13.7 GW, with one greater than 500 MW (Scoop Hill Wind Farm in Dumfries & Galloway) and two greater than 400 MW (Viking Wind Farm in Shetland and Teviot Wind Farm in Borders). Another 28 of these windfarms are greater than 100 MW in installed capacity.

Onshore wind project lifecycle, job roles and skills levels

A typical onshore wind project is led by a project developer, who will normally operate the wind farm when it is operational. The developer is supported by a number of contractors and sub-contractors. An onshore wind farm project has five phases with the following durations: feasibility (1 year), development (3-4 years), construction (1-2 years), operation and maintenance (25+ years) and end-of-life. See Figure 1 and detailed descriptions of each project phase below. The project lifecycle structure is based on the ITPEnergised experience of consulting and managing over 500 projects for onshore wind developers. It also aligns with the onshore wind project lifecycle used in recent analysis undertaken in relation to Scottish Government policy (see Section 5). An overview of each project phase and typical workforce composition, in terms of full-time equivalent (FTE^[3]) positions and job roles, is provided in Table 1. For the purposes of this study, Optimat and ITPEnergised have developed a model based on a ‘typical’ wind farm which has 90 MW capacity and comprises fifteen 6 MW turbines^[4].

Figure 1: Onshore wind project phases.

Feasibility is the initial phase where developers engage with landowners and review potential onshore wind farm locations. This is followed by high-level analysis to understand whether the site has potential and whether there are any obvious issues that might prevent a wind farm being developed. Issues can include connections to the electricity grid, access to the site and whether there are any existing wind farms neighbouring the site. Feasibility can last up to a year and requires around four FTEs (see Table 1).

During the Development phase more detailed assessments are carried out by the developer with support from specialised environmental and technology consultancy firms. These include assessment of potential impacts on ecology, ornithology, geology, hydrology, peatland, noise & vibration, cultural heritage, archaeology, forestry, landscape & visual impact, aviation, and radar and telecommunications. It will also include an assessment of energy yields and some initial engineering design to understand costs. These are essential to the developer’s business case and planning application. During this phase the developer will engage with planning officers within local authorities and the Scottish Government’s Energy Consents Unit (ECU), and with statutory bodies (such as NatureScot) to secure planning permission. The planning process currently takes between two and four years, depending on whether there are any objections to the application that require a public inquiry. At the same time the developer will engage with the appropriate Distribution Network Operator (DNO) to secure a date for connection of the wind farm to the national electricity grid. Finally, the developer will engage with the local community to address any concerns they may have at the earliest possible stage. Overall, this can be the longest phase pre-operations, typically three to four years and requiring around ten FTEs (see Table 2).

When it comes to Construction and installation, developers will typically appoint one or more principal contractors, including the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the wind turbines. This initial procurement phase takes at least six months, and sometimes longer for wind turbines. The timing is also critical as most construction takes place over the summer months. Each of the primary contractors will subcontract others to fulfil local or specialised roles, including building access roads, foundations for turbines, substations and other onsite buildings, and delivering balance of plant (all of the cabling, components and equipment required to deliver electricity to the grid). These contractors, in turn, may also have subcontractors. There is, therefore, a complex supply chain hierarchy. The final part of this phase is physical connection of the wind farm to the grid, which is undertaken by specialist high voltage engineers working for the DNO. Overall, the construction and installation phase lasts at least one to two years, and requires around 148 FTEs across 16 different roles (see Table 3).

Once a wind farm is operational, the OEM that supplied the wind turbines will generally provide Operation & Maintenance services for up to 10 years. The operator will subsequently take out a maintenance contract with an independent service provider (ISP), who will generally service all of that operator’s sites. Most ISPs operate across the whole of the UK, but usually specialise in O&M for a few manufacturers, as technicians must be certified to work on specific wind turbine models. Operators of larger wind farms may, in addition, directly employ a few wind turbine technicians in addition to ISPs performing the bulk of O&M activities. Our ‘typical’ wind farm will require around five FTEs across 10 different roles (see Table 4).

At the End of life stage (typically 25 years), the operator can choose to decommission the wind farm, extend its operational life, or repower with larger turbines. Life extension is often sought as this is the most economical option. In this case the existing turbines are retained in place. Repowering can generate additional revenue from larger turbines, capitalising on the fact that these older sites tend to be in the most optimal locations for onshore wind. In the case of repowering, however, the operator/owner must essentially begin the project lifecycle again. For the purposes of our ‘typical’ wind farm we are assuming a similar level of FTE requirements to construction and installation. This is because the majority of end-of-life activities will not take place until later in this decade, at which point new turbines will be typically at least two to three times as powerful as the existing turbines. In addition, existing turbines might not be supported by the OEMs due to their age, making O&M more difficult (see Table 5).

Although specialised consultancies have been described for the development phase, these can also be engaged during any of the other phases. Overall, this highlights the broad range of roles that are required for a wind farm project. For the technical roles in particular, individuals require a significant number of years’ experience (see Appendix C). Tables 1 to 5 also illustrate that usually a wind farm project will employ most people during construction and installation and end-of-life phases. The next section provides a more detailed analysis of this.

In addition to the original turbines installed on the project site, wind farms require components to be manufactured and supplied throughout the project’s lifecycle. There are no manufacturers of large (multi-MW) wind turbines in the UK, and many of the components within these turbines are also not manufactured in the UK. This means that turbines and their parts must be imported. There is, however, end-of-life and remanufacturing capability within Scotland. Renewable Parts (based in Renfrew and Lochgilphead) refurbishes turbine components such as gearboxes for resupply to companies that provide operations and maintenance services. ReBlade, based in Glasgow and Dumfries, specialises in the decommissioning and recycling of blades and nacelles.

Current and future job numbers and their geographic distribution

Estimating current and future job numbers and types

The rapidly expanding activity in the onshore wind industry, in alignment with the nation’s net zero targets, represents a significant economic opportunity for Scotland. To enable this scale of activity, the sector will require a skilled and experienced workforce. It is, therefore, important to understand the overall number of FTE jobs that will be active in the sector on an annual basis, as well as the overall scale of economic activity in job creation in 2024-2030. This is an important distinction to ensure a clear understanding that some of the jobs will be temporary in nature (e.g., construction-related), whilst others will be permanent for the lifecycle of the project (e.g., operations).

The traditional economic modelling approach for estimating FTE numbers is based on the Gross Value Added (GVA) of the sector, calculated as a function of its turnover using historical ratios of these figures. A major limitation of this approach is the overall lack of detail as this method provides a broad overview rather than detailed insights into specific job roles within an industry. It does not easily break down workforce needs into different categories of employment, such as managerial, technical, or operational roles. Further, this approach relies on historical data and static assumptions about the relationship between economic output and employment. Most importantly, in sectors undergoing rapid transformation, such as renewable energy, the past may not be a reliable predictor of the future. Innovations, cost reductions, and changes in regulatory or market environments can significantly impact both GVA and employment levels in ways that historical data cannot predict.

To address these challenges, we developed an approach that makes use of a simulated model of a ‘typical’ onshore wind farm, ITPEnergised in-house expertise of equivalent projects, and refined and tested this through in-depth stakeholder consultation. This was combined with additional data sources as discussed with the study Steering Group. The model structure is presented in Figure 2. This is, to our knowledge, the first systematic attempt to conceptualise workforce composition in an onshore wind farm project.

The development of a ‘typical’ onshore windfarm model and approach for estimating FTE requirements per project phase and per job role associated with each phase are described in Appendix D.

The FTE predictions were triangulated against data in the Low Carbon and Renewable Energy Economy (LCREE) estimates (Office for National Statistics, 2021) that have been analysed and interpreted, in detail, by Ramboll UK in 2023 (Ramboll, 2023). Using the corresponding onshore wind project data from the Renewable Energy Planning Database (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 2021), we calculated the estimate of FTE per GW in construction and operations. Details on the validation process and data sources can be found in Appendix D.

Finally, we combined our model of a ‘typical’ onshore wind farm, with data from BVG Associates regarding the pipeline of the onshore wind projects in the timeframe 2024-2030, to project workforce requirements on an annual and regional basis. The BVG Associates database expands on the data contained in the REPD by forecasting wind farm project movement through different project stages up until 2030. It also includes information on planned wind farms that are not yet in the public domain.

An overview of our approach is provided in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Overview of workforce model developed within this study.

Figure 3 provides an overview of projected FTE by project stage on an annual basis to 2030. This highlights the large number of jobs in construction with a peak in 2027. O&M activities are expected to increase steadily throughout this decade and require almost 1,500 FTE by 2030. Significant end-of-life activities are not expected to begin until 2029.

Figure 3: Annual FTE per onshore wind project stage.

Using the capacity predictions on an annual basis, we calculated the number of FTE per job role per year in 2024-2030 (see Table 6). In total, the forecasted scale of activity will require an average of 14,256 FTE each year until 2030, with a particularly high demand for civils contractors and individuals that will deliver the grid connection and installation. It is, however, important to note that the majority of jobs in the onshore wind construction sector might not be sustained in the long term as currently the onshore wind project pipeline predictions show a decrease in activity from 2028 onwards. However, these construction jobs are highly transferrable to other infrastructure projects, including in offshore wind. In contrast, jobs created in operations and maintenance are likely to be sustained over the lifespan of an onshore wind project.

The colour code is indicative of the relative magnitude of FTEs required; green indicates low and red indicates high, a darker colour indicates a higher number.

Further detail of FTE requirements for different project stages is provided in Appendix D.

Predicting the geographical distribution of onshore wind skills demands

We used the BVG Associates data, as requested by the Steering Group, to analyse workforce requirements for different project stages on an annual basis and at a local authority (LA) level. The data for construction and installation, and O&M are presented in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively, as these project stages have the largest workforce requirements (in the period to 2030), the vast majority of which will be needed onsite. This highlights that Dumfries & Galloway, and Highland local authorities will have the highest workforce demands. Each of these LAs is projected to need more than 20% of the total construction and installation workforce requirements in 2026 and 2027, and Highland will also require 21% of the total workforce in 2028. In terms of O&M, Highland will require more than 20% of the projected workforce in each of 2027, 2028, 2029 and 2030.

It is also clear from this analysis that several Local Authorities will have little or no onshore wind activity throughout this period, as shown in Table 7 and Table 8 below.